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Chapter I. 
INTRODUCTION. 
Reams of newBprint have been written about John 
L. Lewis and the United Mine Workers of America, yet there 
is probably no union more misunderstood by the general 
public. It will be the mission of this thesis in part to 
try to lift the veil of misunderstanding between the mine 
workers and the public. 
This thesis is an attempt to put the policies, 
expressed verbally, into print. This procedure may be 
questioned because of the transition and possible refor-
mation of the verbal into the written word. Available 
statistics will be shown to support and show the results 
of the policies as formulated. 
1.) How important or significant are the general 
policies of the United Mine Workers to the general econom-
ic picture? The indispensability of coal to public health, 
public safety, and the national economic military secur-
ity bas been stressed time and again. Despite the inroads 
of competing sources of energy, coal still supplies the 
fuel necessary to heat more than half of all the homes and 
apartments throughout the Naticn. It drives nine out of 
ten railway locomotives. It is the source of energy for 
more than half of the electric power produced. It fur-
nishes the coke for every ton of steel made in the country. 
It is the source of chemica.ls essential to the manufacture 
l.. 
of many paints, drugs, plastics, insecticides, perfumes, 
rubber goods, explosives, aniline dyes, and other products. 
It comprises more than one-quarter of all freight carried 
by American railroads and pays more than ten per cent of 
their gross revenues per year. 
It has been estimated that over 75 per cent of 
the miners employed in all coal mines are members of the 
United Mine Workers of America while in the bittuninous coal 
mines, over 85 per cent of employed miners are members. 
These hundreds of thousands of individuals with their depend-
ents constitute a sizeable segment of the American population. 
so wben one considers the number of people involved and the 
importance of the coal industry, the policies of this union 
take on significance. 
2.) There has been some work done in this field. Many 
of the writers, however, have chosen to write of the person-
alities within the union rather than the general policies of 
the union. In the recent book_, ''John L. lewis", by Saul 
Alinsky, the United Mine Workers were the background for 
infatuation with the personality of John L. Lewis. Mr .. 
Alinsky's work is a good biography but is not helpful to 
one interested in the general policies of the United Mine 
workers. "Men and Coal" by McAlister Coleman, published by 
Farrar and Rinehart in 1936, is a good study of the coal 
industry and the men employed in it. The general policies 
of the United Mine workers are not formally outlined in this 
2 .• 
work but one may glean them from reading. 
There have been cbange .s since 1936 in the United 
Mine Workers' policies. There bas been realization of 
policies that bad existed only in the dreams of union 
leaders previously. Some of these policies have been 
dealt with in "Coal and Unionism" by David J. McDonald 
and Edward A. Lyndi, published in 1938 by Lynald Book~~ 
Silver Springs, Maryland. This was a privately printed 
book to commemorate the golden anniversary of the found-
ing of the United Mine Workers of America. This work 
had a tendency to gloss over some of the facets of the 
general policies. It is probably due to the fact that 
this book was written as a commemorative work rather than 
a serious attempt to define the general policies. 
In reviewing the work done in this field McAlister 
Coleman's treatment is the most complete. No works deal-
ing directly with the general policies of the United Mine 
Workers of America have been found. Any treatment has 
been in an indirect manner without defining the policies 
or admitting their existence. The emphasis has been on 
the accomplishment rather than the reasoning behind said 
accomplishments. 
3.) The history of the United Mine Workers shall be 
dealt with briefly. It is not felt that a lengthy history 
is necessary for a full treatment of our topic. The inter-
ested reader can find full histories in "Men and Coal" by 
3 .• 
McAlister Coleman or "A History of the Coal Miners of the 
United states" by Andrew Roy. It is considered pertinent 
to include a brief history so as to have some background 
for the later discussion of the present general policies 
of the United Mine Workers of Anerica. 
The earliest attempt to organize the coal miners 
on a large scale was in Pennsylvania and I~linois in the 
1850's. The American Mine Association was organized in 
January 1861 and was the first national union of mine 
workers . . This association was of short duration because 
of the unfavorable economic conditions following the Civil 
war and the usual dissensions within the organization. 
There were isolated locals remaining~ however, and in 1873 
they formed the Miners National Association. The association 
had not gotten a good start when it was hit by the panic 
of 1873 and went out of existence entirely three years 
later. 
These associations, despite their unfortunate 
records, served a purpose. Coal miners had experienced 
organization and organizing campaigns. Unionism was no 
longer an unknown condition to them. By 1885 the National 
Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers and the National 
Assembly of Miners of the Knights of Labor were organized 
and in 1890, these two organizations joined together to 
form the United Mine Workers of America. This union, 
which now represents the grea} majority of all coal miners 
4. 
-in America~ met many difficulties in the years following 
its inception. Its growth in power and strength has been 
uneven and irregular. There has been no pattern in its 
growth either by years or states. There were periods of 
rapid growth and periods of rapid decline. There have 
been times when the union was very strong i n some states 
and in other states alternately weak and strong. In other 
per i ods, the union declined to a critical point in all 
states. 
In the early 1900 1 ~ its growth paced that of 
the industry. During and immediately after World War I, 
the United Mine Workers increased their membership sub-
stantially. The 1922 Bituminous strike was a long and 
bitter one, resulting in a great loss of membership especial-
ly in the Southern fields. A wage increese was granted in 
the Northern fields as a result of the strike. In 1924, a 
contract was signed that maintained the level of w~ges in 
the union fields. The coal industry was in a serious 
depression and many of the mines shut down. Opposition to 
unionism on the part of management reaehed its peak in the 
nj_neteen-twenties and was intensified by economic conditions. 
The union's loss in membership was accelerated by the great 
depression of the thirties. 
The loss of natural markets of he northern 
fields to the non-union southern fields, the competj_tion 
of other fuels, a reluctance on the part of union workers 
5. 
to accept wage reductions, and the general depression of 
the thirties reduced the proportion of union-mined coal 
fro.m over 70 per cent in 1922 to about 15 per cent in 
1 
1932. In 1933, with the passage of National Industrial 
Recovery Act which required recognition of collective 
bargaining-- a new era for unionism began in the industry. 
Eventually close to 95 per cent of labor employed was work-
ing under collective bargaining agreements entered into 
between the representatives of organized labor and operators. 
It is estimated that less than 10 per cent of all miners 
are not members either of the United Mine Workers of America 
or of the snBller Progressive Mine workers of America. 
The union has won many successes over the years 
of matters of wages and hours. In 1932, the workweek was 
over 48 hours a week, a slight reduction from the pre world 
war I workweek of 52 hours. In 1937, the basic workweek of 
35 hours was established and has continued ever since. 
Longer workweeks have been and are being worked with over-
time pay for all hours over thirty-five. Wages have in-
creased from $4.00 a day in 1932 to $5.50 a day in 1935 
and to ~~7 .oo in 1941. The Krug-Lewis Agreement of 1946 
3 
established a daily wage of $13.05. The National Bitum-
1.) Berquist, F.E., and Associates, Economic Survey of the 
Bituminous-Coal Industry Under Free Competition and Code 
Regulation, p.6: National Recovery Administration, Industry 
Studies Section, March 1936. 
2.) Ibid, p.8. 
3.) Bureau of Labor Statistics, u.s.Department of Labor, 
The Changing Status of Bituminous-CoalMiners: Bull. 882, 
August 1946 pp 1 - 9. · 
6. 
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inous Coal Wage Agreertent of 1950 raised the basic daily 
4 
wage to $14.05. 
4.) No writer can write about the policies of a union 
unless he unders ·tands the psychology of the members of the 
union. J. A. Schumpeter, late professor of economics at 
Harvard University, said: "Only in a very special sense 
can we speak of a nation's policy of policies. In general 
declared policies are nothing but verbalizations of group 
interests and attitudes that assert themselves in the 
struggle of parties for points in the political game, though 
every group exalts the policies that suits it into eternal 
principles of a 'common good' that is to be safeguarded by 
5 
an imaginary kind of state." Professor Schumpeter was 
speaking of political parties but it is equally applicable 
to labor unions. 
Miners are like other industrial workers, but are 
6 
closer to the soil. Their work i ng places are part of the 
soil, not man constructed as with other industrial workers. 
The coal miner, the world over, is highly individualistic 
and steeped in tradition. The British Labour Party has 
had difficulty with the Welsh coal miners although those 
same miners have been the backbone of that party. Govern-
4.) Source-National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950-
Executed at Washington, D.C., March 5, 1950. 
5.) Arthur Smithies-" Joseph Alois Schumpeter," p.644- Sept. 
1950- The American Economic Review, Menasha, Wiscons'in. 
6.) .These 6bservations are not the professional psychologist's 
or sociologists analysis of t~e coal miner. They are the 
practical observatiorrs made by men intimately connected with 
the coal mining industry. 
7. 
ment ownership has made no difference to the miners. 
Hitler had difficulty with the Ruhr coal miners during 
his regime. The coal miner is individualistic because, 
although be works with others, his personal safety is 
often dependent upon his personal actions. He has a 
pride in his work because he is a craftsman. 
One thing t bat must be remembered throughout 
our discussion is that mining has requirements that must 
be met by the individual. It is a laborious industry 
which requires ability to withstand the noxious gases 
which are present in their working places. So it re-
quires physical stamina and quickness of reaction be-
cause of the constant hazard that bear upon the miners 
at work. These facts reflect another reason for tl:w 
miner being so individualistic or as some put it plain 
cantankerous. The following statement was made by Presi-
dent John L. Lewis in 1947 reflecting the miners' feel-
ings on this score. Mr. Lewis said: "There are no 
Government clerks that you are laying off that are go-
ing to mine coal. Do you think one of the Government 
clerks you are laying off the Government payroll is go-
ing to take a job in a coal mine1 Do you know of one 
coal opera tor who would hire any of these qovernment 
clerks1 No not unless he brought his own coffin and his 
own ambulance and his own attendant with him to carry h~ 
a. 
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out." The conditions of his work and the personal re-
sponsibility of his safety go together to make the miner 
an individualist in the strict sense. 
It is well to note that tradition is great in 
hazardous occupations. We have the lumberjacks with the 
Paul Bunyan saga and many other traditions. The railroads 
have their romance. The coal miners are no exception and 
every section of the industry has its local tradition. 
The isolation of many mining camps has increased the feel-
ing of oneness among the miners. The miners are away from 
other classes of workers - the binding tie is common work 
experiences rather than the social or ra~ial class. So 
traditions amont the miners as a class increase because 
of this. 
Thus we have enumerated the reasons for the 
seeming paradox-that the miner is highly individualistic 
yet bound to others by a common interest and traditions. 
This among other reasons separates the miner from other 
classes of industrial workers. 
In only three of the last eighteen years have 
the miners averaged more tbs.n 250 days per year. As shown 
in the following table, the miners did not average 200 
days per year for nine of the nineteen years. In only 
7.) Testimony of John L. Lewis before the House of Repre-
sentatives Subcommittee on Miners Welfare of the Committee 
on Education and Labor-April 3, 1947. p.53, United States 
Government printing Office, Washington: 1947-Printed for 
the use of the Committee onEducation and Labor. 
. 
thirteen of the last thirty-two years have the miners 
averaged more than 200 days per year. So miners are haunted 
men. Their minds are vexed with the memories of struggles 
for higher pay and greater work security. 
Table I. 
The Average No. of Days Worked. 
Year Days Worked Year Days Worked 
1930 187 1940 202 
1931 160 1941 216 
1932 146 1942 246 
1933 167 1943 264 
1934 178 1944 278 
1935 179 1945 261 
1936 199 1946 214 
1937 193 1947 234 
1938 162 1948 217 
1939 178 
Source: U.S.Bureau of Mines Minerals yearbook 1949~ 
The Departl!J9nt of the Interior~ Washington~ D.C. -
The miners have at once a bravado and a horror 
of the hazards inherent in coal mining. Each year their 
ranks are diminished by about 900 to 1,250 men who lose 
their lives through accidents, and each year some 50~000 
more suffer injuries, some of which incapacitate them 
for long periods of time. Tbe non-fatal accidents average 
lOe 
8 
41 days lost time. 
The hazards and economic insecurity or the work 
have produced a curious effect. The miner seldom reels 
any allegiance to a particular coal operator, yet he takes 
a definite pride in his work. The miner is proud of the 
ability that commands a high price but is contemptuous of 
the buyer who pays that price. It is a feeling that has 
helped to shape the pattern of the bitter collective-
bargaining between the coal operators and the union. In 
summary: The miner is highly individualistic but bound 
to others by c ommon interests and traditions. His attitude 
toward management is one of s uspicion and distrust. He 
fears his work but takes a pride in it. The miner reels 
as a "man apart" fram the rest of the populace. This 
narrowness of view is regrettable but true. The isolation 
or many mining camps and the policies of some newspapers 
have increased this feeling on the part of the miners. 
The following excerpt from the testimony of .John L. Lewis 
in hearings on the Centraila, Illinois Mine disaster 
illustrates that point. Mr. Lewis said: "They (the miners) 
are like a wounded bull in a Mexican bull ring. Did you 
ever see one? Did you ever see a bull being baited in 
Mexico while the population cheers and screams with delight, 
just as the population screamed with delight when the mine 
8.) Source: Mines Circular 47 of U.s.Bureau of Mines, 
The Department of the Interior, 1946 pp. 1,2. 
11 .• 
workers were being baited in December of 1946 in this 
country, and when the courts of the country were turned 
loose on them, and every agency of government was to coerce 
them and denounce them and decry them and traduce them? 
Do you think that has any effect on the coal miners of 
9 
the country?" 
5.) The question now arises: What are the general 
policies of the United Mine Workers of America? The union 
does not possess a well-rounded body of policy, because 
unionists are men of action rather than men of thought. 
They are interested primarily in improving their economic 
and social standings in society, not in building theoretical 
edifices. They do have some definite objectives, however, 
and number of these might be called policies. The objectives 
are outlined in the United Mine Workers' Constitution. 
The Wage and Hour Policy is divided into three 
parts: 11 1.) To increase the wages, and improve the con-
ditions of employment of our members by legislation, con-
ciliation, joint agreements or strikes. 2.) To demand 
that not more than six hours from bank to bank in each 
twenty-four hours and not more than five days per week 
shall be worked by members of our organization. 3.) To 
strive for a minimum wage scale for all members of our 
9.) Hearings of House of Representatives Subcommittee on 
Miners Welfare of the Committee on Education and Labor on 
the Centralia Mine Disaster. April 4, 1947, p.44-United 
States Government Printing qrr1e, Washington, D.C.: 1947. 
12.· 
10 
union." 
The Safety and Safety Legislation Policy has one 
objective: 11 To secure by legislative enactment, laws 
protecting the limbs, lives, and health of our members; 
and such other legislation as will be beneficial to the 
11 
members of our craft." 
The Health and Welfare Policy is found in one 
objective:· "To secure equitable statutory old-age pensions, 
Workmen's compensation and unemployment insurance laws. 
To provide for security against old-age and disability of 
12 
members and their depen~ents." The Promotion of Favor-
able Legislation Policy is contained in portions of the 
foregoing objectives and the following objective: "To 
enforce existing just laws and to secure repeal of those 
13 
which are unjust." 
The Mechanization Policy is not formally out-
lined in the United Mine Workers' Constitution but there 
is a definite attitude toward it. The United Mine worker's 
attitude was formulated by John Mitchell, an· earlier U.M.W. 
President, in the early nineteen-hundreds. Mr. Mitchell 
said: "Trade unionists recognize that machinery has enor-
mously multiplied the productive power of the community. 
10.) Constitution of the International Union, United Mine 
Workers of America, Washington, D.C. -Effective November 
1, 1948 - P• 4. 
11.) Ibid P. 5. 
12. ) Ibid - p. 4. 
13.) Ibid- P• 4. 
13 .• 
The trade unionists believe that machinery has not perma-
nently deprived large masses of the population of the 
opportunity to work, and they recognize, amid the evils 
14 
of machinery, great and enduring benefits." This atti-
tude toward mechanization with some modification is held 
by the present union officials. 
The method of approach utilized in examining the 
general policies is a direct one. The social and economic 
conditions that guide the reasoning behind these general 
policies are presented. Statistics that assist in showing 
the cause and effect of these policies are nonexistent in 
some instances. Some policies have little or no support-
ing statistics while others, such as Wages and Hours, have 
a substantial amount of statistical data. 
14.) "organ~zed Labor" 1903 - John Mitchell, PP• 246-247. 
14. 
Cl;l.apter II. 
WAGES AND HOURS. 
The cardinal objective of any union is wages and 
hours and the United Mine workers are no exception. There 
is no one wage and hour policy for unions because they sell 
services at the best price and under the best conditions 
that they can obtain. The most significant gains in wages 
for tbe United Mine Workers have taken place since 1937. 
These wage increases were made on the upswing of the busi-
ness cycle and the prosperous war years which made it possi-
ble for the increased costs to be absorbed with less diffi-
culty. 
1.) Wages rose fromthe extremely low levels of 28¢ 
averagely hourly earnings in 1897 to an average of 40¢ per 
hour in 1914, an increase of 30% in 17 years. Workers in 
bituminous coal and anthracite mining shared with factory 
workers and others the increases during and soon after 
world War I, so that by 1923 average hourly earnings aver-
aged 85¢, 212.5% over 1914. During the 1923-1929 period, 
the coal industry was in a depression and wages fell 20% 
to 68¢ per hour on the average. The union's fight, against 
the decrease in hourly rates and the lowering of rates on 
incentive work, reached its peak in the general strike of 
1927. This strike was the longest in coal mining history 
and the average number of days lost per man was 153. The 
strike was not successful and the wage rate continued to 
15. 
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fall until it ~eached a low in 1933 of 50¢ per hour. The 
1934 agreement for the Northern Appalachian fields provided 
for the 35 hour week of 5 days and 7 hours per day. Rates 
of pay were increased by 22 per cent and the average hour-
ly earnings per employee jumped to 71 cents. The terms of 
the contract were embodied in theN. R. A. Coal Code and 
applied to 75 per cent of the coal miners. This was extend~ 
ed by 1935 to about 98 per cent of all coal miners. 
2.) The period since 1937 has been marked by great 
advances in wages. The basic workweek of 35 hours was 
maintained until the agreement of 1943 and was resumed 
again in 1946. The starting point of the wage increases 
is the agreement signed in April of 1937. The following 
paragraph is an excerpt from a Bureau of Labor Statistics 
bulletin. 
"The agreement of April 1937 extended to March 
1941, and covered a part of the crucial period of prepa-
ration for national defense. The agreement retained the 
35 hour workweek of 5 days and- 7 hours per day, which had 
been adopted and extended by 1935 to about 98 per cent of 
the workers. The agreement for the Northern Appalachian 
areas provided for an increase of 50 cents per day, from 
· $5.50 to $6.00 (or from 78.6 to 85.7 cents per hour). 
15.) All preceding fi gures taken from a letter by: Coal 
Economics Division, u. s. Bureau of Mines, The Department 
of the Interior. September 30, 1950. 
16·. 
The corresponding increase of 5o cents in the Southern 
Appalachian districts was from $5.10 per day (or from 72.9 
to 80.0 cents per hour). The agreement provides for equiva-
lent increases for other groups, including the piece rates 
of tonnage workers. Outside of the Appalachian territories, 
regional differences were recognized, depending on such 
conditions as the nature of the coal seams, customary 
arrangements, and in some instances the economic status 
of mines. The 1937 agreement introduced premium pay for 
overtime at time and one half. The 1939 agreement renewed 
the terms of the 1937 contract relating to wages and hours. 
Prolonged negotiations, accompanied by the shutdown of the 
16 
mines, dealt largely with the demand for a union shop." 
The contract negotiations of 1941 took place 
during the early stages of a sharp upturn in prices and 
wages. The union officials presented their demands which 
included a general wage increase of $1 a day for all regular 
classification of inside and outside day men and the elimi-
nation of the North-South and other wage differentials. 
The elimination of wage differentials proved to be the 
major cause of disagreement and work stoppages. The union 
also asked for a guarantee of 200 working days per year. 
This proposal was rejected at the outset by the· operators. 
As to the operators' rejection of the requested guarantee, 
16.) Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S.Department of Labor, 
The Changing Status of Bituminous~oal Miners: Bulletin 
882, p. 2. 
17~ 
President John L. Lewis said: "If the industry cannot 
furnish sufficient opportunity to the men to enable them 
to earn a living wage, then it will have to meet the situ-
17 
atj_on with higher wages when the men do work." 
A separate agreement was signed by the Northern-
Appalachian operators. The agreement provided for an in-
crease of $1 per day or 14.3 cents per hour for basic day 
occupations, contingent upon the elimination of the North-
South differential of 40 cents per day in basic occupations. 
Southern opera~ors were unwilling to eliminate the ·differen-
tials and therefore, on April 11, withdrew from the confer-
ence. M r. Charles O'Neill representative of the Northern 
operators, stated their position as follows: "We regret 
the withdrawal of the Southern operators at the behest of 
several gentlemen among their number who seek to destroy 
the Appalachian Wage Conference. These men, now as ever, 
have continued to make trouble for the industry and the 
18 
country." Negotiations were continued under great 
pressure from the Federal Government for settlement of the 
dispute. Despite this pressure, negotiations were stalled. 
A,t length, however, on July 6, an agreement was reached 
between the union and the southern operators for the elimi-
nation of the differential for day men but not for tonnage 
17.) Joint Report of the International Officers to the 
Thirty-Seventh Constitution of the United Mine Workers of 
America, 1942, P• 12. 
18.) Ibid P• 18. 
18. 
men. The increase for basic day occupations were $1.40 a 
day or 20 cents per hour. The first paid vacations ln the· 
history of the coal indust r y were granted in the two agree-
ments of 1941. The vacation period was from June 28, 1941 
to July 7, 1941 with a flat payment of $20 per man. These 
two agreements covered approximately 150,000 miners. 
The union shop had not been extended to the 
* captive mines, ·- which produced ten per cent of the output 
of coal. Approximately 95% of the 50,000 men employed by 
these mines were union members. Deme.nds were made upon 
the steel companies in the fall of 1941 to extend the union 
shop to the captive mines. On November 22, 1941, President 
Roosevelt appointed an arbitration board consisting of Dr. 
John R. Steelman, as the public representative. Mr. Benjamin 
Fairless, representative of the steel industry; and Mr. John 
L. Lewis, representing the mine workers. This board ruled 
in favor of the union on December 7, 1941. 
The gains made by the un i on in this contract 
we r e without precedent in the previous fifty years of tbe 
union's existence. A brief summary of these gains is as 
follows: 
* 
1. Establishment of the union shop throughout 
tbe entire bituminous coal industry, includ-
ing the formerly impregnable captive mines. 
A "captive" mine is one owned by a steel company and 
whose entire production is utilized by tbe steel company. 
19 • . 
2. Elimination of the day-wage differential 
between Northern and Southern mines. 
3. The highest wage concessions from the coal 
operators in the history of the union. 
4. A minimum day-wage guarantee to all workers 
on tonnage rates incentives. 
5. Accepta.nce by the operators of the principle 
that the union may guarantee the parity of 
competitive conditions within the industry 
by the use, if necessary, of the strike 
weapon. 
This contract marked the end of regional wage scales. It 
established an industry-wide wage scale without regard to 
social or economic factors, and marked a break-away from 
* the old "going-wage" theory tl:en existent. 
The seven-hour day was abandoned in the 1943 
agreement. The Ickes-Lewis Agreement of 1943 provided for 
a 9 hour day underground for inside workers, including 15 
minutes for lunch and an estimated average of 45 minutes 
for travel time. The daily shift of most of the outside 
workers was fixed at 8.5 hours, including a 15 minute 
lunch period which was to be staggered. The 1945 agreement 
modified the hours of work only to a slight extent. Inside 
The "going-wage" was the wage paid for a type of labor 
in a particular area dependent upon the availability of 
the labor in that area and was not dependent upon the 
wage rates paid for similar labor in other areas. 
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workers retained the 9-hour day, figured from portal to 
portal, but the 15 minute lunch period was to be staggered. 
The agreement changed the outside workers to a workday 
of 8 hours and 15 minute lunch period. No changes in basic 
wage rates were made between the agreements of 1937 and 
1946 with · the exceptions of the 1941 changes previously 
described. The Ickes-Lewis Agreement increased the va-
cation payment from $20 to $50 per man with no vacation 
time granted because of war-time exigencies. 
The National Bituminous Wage Conference convened 
in Washington on March 12, 1946 to negotiate a new con-
tract. The conference soon became deadlocked and no progress 
whatever was made. On May 21, the President instructed 
the Secretary of the Interior to take possession of the 
mines and to conduct negote.tions with the United Mine 
workers. The Krug-Lewis Agreement of May 29, 1946, con-
tained the following provisions as to wages and hours. 
(a) Hours--Mines are to be operated 9 hours a day, as 
heretofore, with overtime to be paid after 7 hours. 
(b) Wages--a basic hourly increase of 18.5 cents, which 
with overtime means a daily increase of $1.85. The Krug-
Lewis Agreement increased the vacation pay to $100 to 
full-time employees and a pro-rata share thereof to part-
time employees. 
The 1947 and 1948 agreements between the operators 
and union were similar as rega~s wages and hours. The 
21. 
provisions of the two agreements were as follows: (a) For 
* all inside employees a work day of eight hours from portal 
to portal is established, including a staggered thirty min-
* 
utes for lunch. (b) For all outside employees a work 
day of seven hours and fifteen minutes with a staggered 
thirty minutes for lunch. The 1947 agreement provided for 
an increase of $3.05 a day or 38.13 cents ~r hour. The 1948 
agreement provided for $1 a day increase or 12.5 cents per 
hour rise. The 1947 and 1948 agreements included the pro-
vision of vacation pay of $100 to full-time employees and 
a pro-rata share thereof to part-time employees. 
The National Bituminous Coal Agreement of 1950 
was preceded by the bitterest bargaining and strikes since 
the period of the 1930's. After 9 months of the three-day 
week and work stoppages, the agreement waa signed on March 
5, 1950 1950 and is effective to June 30, 1952. This 
contract is the same as the 1947 and 1948 agreements in 
regards to hours. It calls for a basic eight hour day 
and forty hour week with overtime paid beyond this. It 
provided for a 70 cents per day increase or 8.75 cents 
per hour wage increase. The $100 vacation payment to 
full-time employees and a pro-rata share thereof to part-
time employees was extended by the National Bitu~inous 
* "Inside" workers are those workers employed underground 
in the production of coal. 
* "Outside"workers are those workers that work on the sur-
face. These workers are employed mainly in maintenance and 
supply work. 
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Coal Agreement of 1950. 
Wage rates, important as they are to the miners 
and operators have less meaning than actual total earnings. 
23 .. 
A man earning a basic rate of $1.75 an hour and working 24 
hours a week obviously has less pay than a man earning a 
$1.25 an hour and working 40 hours a week. Of all figures 
collected by statisticians and others, none are as difficult 
to understand as those on the coal miners earnings. This is 
caused by the myriad of occupations gathered under one term -
"bituminous coal miner". There are different working periods 
for the various occupations. Some outside men work an 8 
hour day; some work seven hours and fifteen minutes. Another 
difficulty is mine workers are employed by the mont h, day, 
or tonnage, yardage, deadwork, or foota ge rate. 
However, some s ta tis tics are presented of the 
earnings of the bituminous coal industry as compared with 
all manufacturing industries for 1939 to March 1948 as 
these are a de qua te for further discuss ion. 
The following table shows the weekly earnings of 
the bituminous coal industry as compared with the average 
of all manufacturing industry. It must be noted, however, 
that the miners in 1946 and 1947 were working a 54-hour week 
as compared with an avera ge 40-hour workweek in manufact-
uring industries. 
19.) All figures taken from actual contracts of 1937, 1941, 
1943, 1945, 1946, 1948, 1950. Courtesy of United Mine 
workers of America, washington, n.c. 
TABLE II 
EARNINGS - BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY 
Compared with All Manufacturing Industries. 
• • Net S~endable • Net Spendable Weekly Earnings • . • 
:Gross :Weekly Earnings: Expressed in 1939 Dollars 
Year :Weekly: • • . • 
and :Earn- ;Single: Family : Single • Family of Four • 
Month:ings :Worker: of Four . Worker • • • 
• All Manu-• 
• Bituminous Coal Industry facturing • 
• Industries • . 
1939 $23.88 $23.60 $23.64 $23.60 $23.64 $23.62 
1940 24.71 24.22 24.46 24.03 24.26 24.75 
1941 30.86 29.21 30.55 27.60 28.87 2'7 .67 
194Z!. 35.02; 30.44 34.67 25.97 29.58 30.96 
1943 41.58 34.79 40.08 27.98 32.23 33.30 
1944 51.27 42.35 48.12 33.54 38.11 34.89 
1945 52 .a:5 43.12 48.89 33.38 37.85 33.08 
1946 58.03 49.27 54.84 35.16 39.13 30.78 
1947 66.86 56.44 62.16 35.24 38.81 29.75 
1948 
Jan. 75.78 65.30 71.54 38.45 42.13 30.29 
Feb. 70.54 60.97 67.08 36.18 39.81 30.38 
Mar. 74.61 64.33 70.54 38.31 42.01 30.63 
Note: Net Spendable weekly earnings are obtained by deduct-
ing from gross weekly earnings ·.social security and income 
taxes for which the specified worker is liable. Net spend-
able weekly earnings expressed in terms of 1939 dollar.e 
are obtained by deflating net spendable weekly earnings 
by the changes in the Bureau's Consumers' ?rice Index. 
source: U• s. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics Employment Statistics Branch. 
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From the foregoing table, it is noted that the 
greatest increase in gross earnings took place between 
the war years of 1943 and 1944. The gross weekly earn-
ings have increased nearly 2~ times in a nine-year period. 
Their 1947 net spendable weekly earnings are 64 per cent 
above the 1939 earnings, both expressed in 1939 dollars. 
The 1947 net spendable weekly earnings for all manufact-
uring industries show an increase of 26% over the 1939 
figure, both expressed in 1939 dollars. It is evident 
that the miners have gained more in this 9 year period 
than have the average of all manufacturing industries. 
It must be remembered, however, that there are 
important differences between the coal industry and the 
group of manufacturing industries represented in Table 
II. some of these differences are: 
1.) The elements of risk and hazard involved. 
2.) The skills required in t he industry. 
3.) The amount of overtime available and worked. 
4.) The proportion of skilled to unskilled or 
semiskilled labor. 
5.) The proportion of males to females. 
6.) The amount of employment offered; whether 
industry bas seasonal and cyclical unem-
ployment. 
Yearly earnings are more meaningful to the miner 
than weekly earnings. The miner must feed, clothe, and 
25.. 
shelter himself and his family throughout the year, and 
his ability to do so depends upon how much he can earn 
all yea.r, for year after year. Upon the size and regu-
larity of his annual income depends his ability to pay 
for adequate medical care, to buy his own home, or to 
rent better housing. Some figures "indicative" of annual 
earnings are presented in Table III. These are not act-
ual figures but arithmetical .estimates. They will show 
relative changes from year to year. 
Table III - Estimated average annual earnings of employees 
in selected industries. 
: Bituminous : Metal : Iron & : Auto- : Lumber and 
Year : Mining : Mining : Steel : mobiles: Timber Prod. 
1939 : $1,164 
1940 : 1,212 
1941 
1942 : 
1943 
1944 : 
1945 : 
1946 : 
1,516 
1,736 
2,110 
2,600 
2,650 
2,465. 
: $1,420 : $1,358 $1,620 : $ 860 
1,488 : 1,444 : 1,775 : 897 
• . 
• • 
• 
• 
• .
• 
• 
• 
• 
1, 650 : 1, 730 : 
1,931 : 2,060 : 
2 1 09 0 : 2 1 3 80 : 
2,250 : 2,520 : 
2,335 : 2:,470 : 
2,365 : 2,293 : 
2,060 : 
2,640 
2,940 : 
2,980 : 
2,755 : 
2,508 : 
1,018 
1,205 
1,452 
1,572 
1,555 
1,634 
Source: Coal Mines Administration Report, 1947, u. S. 
Department of Interior. PP• 27-28. 
It is evident from Table III the miners have 
fared well in the period from 1939 to 1946. Their 1946 
annual earnings are 212 per cent above the 1939 earnings. 
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All of the other selected industries have gained less 
than 200 per cent. The metal mining industry is the closest 
to bituminous mining with a gain of 173 per cent. So the 
coal miners have gained nearly 40 per cent more than the 
highest of the selected industries. This increase is due 
to a better market for their product and concerted action 
by the union. Favorable economic conditions were the major 
allies of the union in this rise in wages but one must not 
under-estimate the power of a militant union. 
When comparing 1933 and early 1948, the figures 
are more significant. Figures released by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics show that the average hourly earnings of 
the mine workers have increased 269 per cent from $.501 
in September, 1933 to $1.847 in January, 1948. In contrast, 
the average weekly earnings in those same periods show an 
increase from $15.78 to $75.78, or 380 per cent, while 
the average hours of work per week increased from 31.9 
to 40.9 or 28 per cent. 
Another fact in the increase of the annual wage 
is the average number of days worked. In the period from 
1939 to 1946, the miners averaged 245 working days per man 
per year, and lost an average of 16 days per year per man. 
This is compared with an average of 167.6 days per man per 
year in the period of 1930 to 1934 with an average per man 
of 48.6 days lost by striking. 
For full-time employment the 5 day week-50 week 
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I 
year or a total of 250 working days per year i s used. 
According to the 1949 Bureau of Mines Mineral Yearbook~ 
the average number of days worked have equalled or exceed-
ed that figure only three t i mes in the past f~ fty-eight 
years. These three years were the war years ~f 1943, 1944, 
and 1945. In the years since then, the minerl have worked 
an average of 210 days. These figures do not [reflect total 
employment. The avera ge number of men employld have de-
clined from a high of 704,793 in 1923 to a lo in 1945 of 
383~000. 
The figures presented in the past few pages show 
substantial gains by the miners 1n wages and ~ours. The 
figures do not reflect the struggle for t~ose I same ga~ns. 
Mere figures can never reveal the poverty and 1 hunger in 
the mi ners' homes during the long and bitter ~ trikes. 
I 
There were strikes of 117 days i n 1922~ of 15~ days in 
1927, and of 120 days in 1932. The year, 194J , was a year 
of the three day week and a long strike. Thi~ strike was 
in progress intermittently throughout 1949 an1 until March, 
1950. The amount of time lost f r om strikes is important 
to the economy as well as the miners. Each d1y on strike 
affects the rnonets_ry national inc ome as well , s the real 
national income. 
No consistent pattern has appeared ~n the wage 
gains. There have been per i ods of substantial wage gains 
followed by periods of wage decline but both j age rates 
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I 
I 
I 
and annual wages have shown a steady increase [. The ste.-
1 tistics presented show the gains made over a period of 
years. The union has been conslstent in presr nting their 
I demands for higher wages and shorter hours during each 
collective bargaining session. Prevailing cor ditions 
have forced them to modify their demands but ~heir record 
I 
in these matters has shown great gains in the[ long run. 
I 
The objectives regarding wages and hours as Jutlined in 
the United Mine Workers of Amer i ca Consti tut 4on have been 
followed. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
. I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Chapter III. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
SAFETY AND SAFETY IEGISLA TION . I 
I 
we come now to a very important po~icy - Safety. 
I This policy is of greater importance to the fine workers 
than to many of the other classes of industr~al workers. 
I 
Some observers think that safety consideratibns are an 
I 
important prop in the "reign" of John L. I.ew[is wherein 
I his unceasing fight for safer working condit
1
ions has en-
abled him to perpetuate his term of office. : This is an 
oversimplification of the facts and poor realsoning on the 
I 
part of many writers. However~ it would be ~qually faulty 
to underestimate the importance of safety t~ the miners. 
1,) It is necessary to look at tbe wo1king environ-
ment in order to gain an idea of the need for and the 
I 
importance of safety. In underground mines~ there are 
I 
several methods of entrance in order to min~ the coal. 
I One of these methods is the entering of a hillside along 
a valley bottom through horizontal tunnels, I called "drifts", 
I 
or by gradually sloping tunnels, called "slopes". Another 
method used to reach the beds of coal is tJ sinking of 
I 
I 
vertical openings downward into the earth, ~own as "shafts". 
I Underground shaft mines range from 100 to 700 feet in 
depth with an average of 350 feet in depth. ! Slope mines, 
I 
on the other hand, may have as much as 2,oop to 3 1 000 
feet of earth coverage. I 
The thickness of the coal seam va~ies considerably 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
between and within states ranging from an avt rage of 3 
feet in Arkansas to 11 feet in Utah. In Penhsylvania, 
I 
Maryland, Virginia, and West Vi rginia, the c ~al seam 
I 
averages about 5 feet in thickness, althoug~ nearly thirty 
I per cent of the coal mined in t hese states i ls from seams 
I 
less than 4 feet in height. In Ohio, more t /han 70 per 
I 
cent of the coal mined is from seams 4 to 6 /feet thick 
while in Illinois, the seams average more t~n 6 feet 
i 
in thickness and the majority of the coal m~ned is from 
I 
seams with a thickness of from 5 to 7 feet. I 
I 
Deep-mining methods causes great 1 rooms" under-
1 
ground with roofs of various stress capacity. Some roofs 
I 
I 
are so uniform that they need no support to 1remain in 
I 
position. The majority of the roofs, howey~ r, are faulty 
I 
with fractures, fissures, and other defects ] so that props 
I 
I 
are necessary to prevent the roof from fall1ing in. Moisture 
I 
and air, everpresent in the "rooms", penetrr te the roofs to 
cause "cave ins". Danger is present even J hen there are 
I 
props due to the problems of decay, proper /placement, and 
I 
adequacy of the props. Roof falls cause t ~e largest num-
1 
ber of injuries and fatalities underground j 
I 
To remove coal from a mine, a co~plex haulage 
I 
I 
system has been developed. The equipment ~sed consists 
I 
of electric locomotives and coal cars with / the capacities 
ranging from 1 to 15 tons. The locomotives range in size 
I 
from 5 to 50 tons. In a Western Pennsylvabia mine, famil-
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
31. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
iar to the author, two fifty-ton locomotives, [tandem-
/ hitched, are used. for haulage of a number of qars. The 
hazards of any transportation medium are thus /added to 
the other hazards of the miners. 
Electrical power is used within the mines to 
power the locomotives and production machine. [ The trol-
l 
ley wires in the haulageways carry a voltage l f 500 or 
250 volts with an amperage of 50 or more. Th~ production 
I 
machine is powered by the same amount. So we / see that 
I the hazards of high-amperage electrical curre l t are pres-
ent in the mines. The production machinery is designed 
for cutting, drilling, and loadi ng coal. Itsl size and 
I 
characteristics are designed for the particul!ar seam size. 
I 
These machines have a great number of moving [parts so 
the hazards of moving parts in a restricted ~rea consti-
tute a real hazard to the miners underground ~ 
Methane gas is present in many min,s in the 
strata above and below the coal seam. As thd seam is 
I 
opened, methane is liberated into the mine atmosphere. 
I 
It is explosive when mixed with air and can 9e ignited 
I by a spark or flame. While concentrations of methane 
gas may reduce the oxygen in the air below e ~istence 
level. Under certain conditions, large amouhts of carbon 
monoxide are encountered. After a mine explbsion, "black 
damp" or carbon monoxide frequently kills as l many men 
I 
as the e~plosion. As a conseque:r;1ce ventilatlion is import-
32 .• 
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I 
ant in mines. 
I 
There are two methods of supplying yentilation 
. I 
in mines: the exhaust type, which pr~duces a / negative 
pressure within the mine; the forced ventilat[on type, 
I 
I 
which builds up a positive pressure within the mine. 
. I 
I Ventilation is so important that the various ,coal-mining 
I states have adopted regulations to control ai~ flow in 
I 
I 
I the mines. 
I 
Drilling, cutting, loading, and ot1er operations 
create considerable quantities of fine coal 1 ust and 
throw it into the surrounding air. Fine coal dust is 
highly explosive and if there is enough presJ nt it can 
be ignited by a spark or open flame. I The prevention of 
I 
open flames and the application of rock dust /on exposed 
I 
coal surfaces minimize this haz-ard but it is ~ neverthe-
1 
I 
I 
less, a definite hazard. 
The breathing of ro~k dust over a r eriod of 
years may cause a lung disease known as s ilipos is. A 
I 
form of this disease peculiar t o the coal milners is known 
as "anthracosilicosis", caused by inhaling J combination 
I 
I 
of rock dust containing silica and coal dust. Another 
I 
disease caused by dust in the air and the d,mpness is; 
known as "miner's asthma". These diseases, /commonly 
I 
found in older miners because of prolonged ~xposure to 
I 
the conditions, are not adequately covered py the ' compen-
sation laws in the coal mining states. 
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I In thick coal seams, the miner can !work erect 
and the laborious work is accomplished by ma ~ hinery. In 
low seams, the bard work o f loading coa 1 is done largely 
. I 
by hand. In these beds, the miner is obliged to squat, 
I 
stoop, kneel or lie on his s i de. The human body is not 
I 
constructed to do heavy work efficiently in ~uch posi-
1 tions. As a result, the miners body is stre~uously taxed 
I 
while working in these low-ceiling places. I 
Coal mines are extremely damp plac~s to work 
in. The humidity at many worki ng faces is n~arly 100 
per cent. Underground streams are often fouhd at or near 
I 
working places so many miners work in constaht moisture. 
I 
This moisture takes its toll on the bones anr. muscles 
I 
of the miners so that rheumati sm and arthriti s are not 
uncommon. I 
I 
From the foregoing pages, we have /seen tbat 
the miner works in a poorly lighted, enclosdd environ-
! 
ment beneath a faulty roof and is exposed td potential 
I 
hazards of dust, explosives, ga s, electrici yy, heavy mach-
inery, and transportation. 1 I 
In the following pa ges available t tatistica of 
the men killed and injured in the coal minef as a result 
I 
os those hazards and working conditions will be shown. 
I 
These tables will further the point that safety rules 
I 
and legislation are necessary . An interesting point on 
safety was made by Eugene Aul i ff in an arti~ le, which 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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appeared in "Coal Age", a trade publication. Mr. Auliff 
suggested - and he said that he was not making it as a 
I 
facetious suggestion - that safety conditions in the mines 
I 
might be improved if the administrative offi? ials had to 
I do some work underground. He said, unfortunately, it was 
I 
a fact that after a great disaster, the operators will 
I 
clean up the mines, they pay the workers co~~nsation 
i 20 
and then forget it and return to the product1ion of coal. 
I 
The following testimony is by Jameis w. Haley, 
Secretaryof the National Coal Association, 9efore a 
I 
House of Representatives Subcommittee. The !membership 
of the National Coal Association comprises J pproximately 
I 
75 per cent of the total commercial bitumindus coal pro-
[ 
duction. Mr. Haley said: "I cannot agree .for a moment 
I 
with the witness preceding me that negligen9e and human 
I failure does not enter in this picture very 1prominently. 
And, indeed, I believe that the earperts sta t e that 80 
• I per cent of all the .acc1dents in the coal mtnes or any-
where else are caused by negligence and 
21 
1 
carelessness on 
the part of the individual." 
I 
I 
I 
I 
20.) "Safety" by Eugene Auli f f, "Coal Aga r , April 1941, 
New York, N. y. P• 32. I 
21.) Testimony of James w. Haley, Secretalry and Gen-
eral Counsel, National Coal Association, W~shington, D.C. 
before a Special Subcommittee of the Commi 1tee on Edu-
cation and Labor, House of Representative~, June 16, 
1949. P• 25. I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
.I 
I 
I 
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TABLE IV. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Accident Rates Based on Per Million Tons of Ooal Produced. 
I 
Portal to Portal 
I 
I 
I 
Year --------~F~a~t~a~1~-----------------N~o~n~f~, a~t~a~l~--------­
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
Bitumi-
nous 
2.50 
2.60 
2.52 
2.68 
2.52 
2.19 
2.61 
2.08 
2.14 
2.06 
1.81 
1.62 
1.50 
1.57 
1.46 
Anthra-
cite 
4.66 
4.69 
5.24 
4.46 
4.16 
4.88 
4.11 
3.88 
3.80 
2.74 
2.62 
2.99 
3.06 
2.54 
Total 
2.78 
2.94 
2.73 
2.83 
2. 79 
2.41 
2.71 
2.22 
2.22 
1.90 
1.71 
1.64 
1.69 
1.56 
Bitumi-
nous 
131.72 
130.74 
127.64 
115.63 
118.21 
105.26 
97.18 
95.37 
90.42 
91.44 
86.05 
82.49 
82.67 
82.41 
72.47 
69.87 
l Anthra-
c~te 
I 
:506.47 
I 
324.95 
I 
~04.17 
I 
f l1.43 
259.19 
I 
F78.27 
i 57.65 
r267.67 
I 
I 1266.47 
232.89 
227.32 
195.59 
212.17 
Total 
154.31 
157.39 
149.37 
137.52 
132.84 
125.54 
115.57 
112.67 
107.14 
104.33 
98.92 
92.99 
93.87 
1211.55 95.55 
1218.57 84.62 
1220.85 83.10 
I 
source: Bureau of Mines - U.s. Department bf the Interior. I 
This chart has been includ~d to s how accident 
I 
rates in the coal industry although the va1lidity of using 
I 
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• I 
this type of chart to show safety improvement is doubtful. 
I 
The reason for doubt is because the producti~ity of the 
I 
individual miner has increased through mechap ization, 
I through improved engineering, and through the improved 
I 
tempo of skilled performance. The average 9utput per man 
I 
has increased from 4.78 net tons per day in 11933 to 6.26 
. I 
net tons per day in 1948. The miners workeq an 8 hour day 
I 
in both of these years. I 
I 
I In 1941, 11.4 per cent of the men 1employed were 
I 
killed or injured while 11.7 per cent of th~ men employed 
I 
in 1948 were killed or injured. Yet, the a1cident rates 
I 
show a reduction of fatalities of .66 per million tons pro-
1 
duced and a reduction of 24.04 per million t ons produced 
I for injuries. The fatalities were .23 per eent of the 
total men employed in 1941 and .22 per cent / of the total 
I 
men employed in 1948. These two years are pomparable as 
the miners worked an average of 213 days ini 1941 and 217 
I 
days in 1948. The reason for this apparent: discrepancy is 
I 
that, although there were 75.,000 less miner:s, they pro-
1 
duced 85 million tons more of coal in 1948 ithan in 1942. 
The basis of per million tons pr~uced to compute 
accident rates has been prese nted because ~ it will be en-
1 
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countered in the claims of safety improvem, nts by the various 
State Bureaus of Mines • . The foregoing page shows the danger 
I 
of accepting such a basis and the probabiltty of under-
1 
statement of fatalities and i~juries. I 
Year 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942:' 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
* 
TABLE V. I 
I * Accident Rates Based on Man-Hours Exposure 
I 
Bitumi-
nous 
1.31 
1.41 
1.46 
1.43 
1.54 
1.36 
1.68 
1.35 
1.41 
1.39 
1.23 
l.ll 
1.10 
1.27 
1.23 
I 
Portal to Portal 
Fatal 
Anthra-
cite 
1.49 
1.50 
1.78 
1.56 
1.58 
1.94 
1.71 
1.50 
1 •. 49 
1.64 
1.50 
1.06 
1.00 
1.13 
1.15 
.93 
Total 
1.34 
1.43 
1.52 
1.45 
1.55 
1.59 
1.42' 
1.65 
1.37 
1.44 
1.40 
1.20 
1.10 
1.10 
1.25 
1.17 
I 
Non:fatal 
I 
Bi tumiJ Anthra-
nous I cite I 
I 
68.87 / 
I 
98.13 
69.39 I 104.15 
Total 
74.58 
76.64 
71.47 
65.62 
103 .16 77.43 
108.80 72.92 
68.05 1 
I 
98.72 72.62 
63.47 1 110.85 71.36 
I 
60.53 1 107.37 68.12 
61.28 1 112.56 68.75 
I 58.93 1 110.83 66.26 
I 
60.21 1 
I 
57.79 11 
56.02 
I 
56.781 
I 
60.271 
I 
I 58.501 
58.4d 
98.73 
89.68 
76.05 
81.12 
83.12 
82.24 
80.83 
65.40 
62.44 
59.06 
60.32 
64.25 
62.37 
62.48 
Per Million Man-Hours. 
I 
I 
I 
Source: Bureau of Mines - u. s . Department lor The Interior. I . 
This basis for computing accideni rates ~s used 
I 
I 
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I 
. I 
by the Federal Bureau of Mines i n accordance r ith sound 
I 
actuarial practice. The amount of exposure :1Js one of the 
I 
bases used by the actuaries of the Metropoli~an Insurance 
I 
Company to determine the class of risk and tije rate to be 
I 
charged. The coal miners are insurable but ds a special 
I 
I 
class and their premium rates are 277% above /the basic 
rate charged to office workers. The coal miners are not 
I 
eligible for accident and health insurance b~cause their 
I 
accident occurrance and severity rates are 1~0% above the 
I 
national a vera ge. I 
As Table IV shows, the greatest arba of accident 
I 
I 
reduction is in nonfatal accidents. The anthracite field 
I 
has shown the greatest improvement in accideF t rates, both 
fa tal and nonfatal. While the se rates · show /progress, they 
I 
manifestly indicate that too many miners s:re killed and 
I 
I injured. 1 
The Bureau of Mines in an analysiJ of the eco-
1 
I 
nomic asp~cts of the losses from injuries g+ve some idea 
I 
of the monetary interest that the public ha~ in mine acci-
1 
dents. The figures presented in this study / are estimates 
I based on experience during 1944. The estimated cost of 
I 
I 
coal-mine injuries in 1944 fo l low: / 
1. Compensation and Medical Costs (direct 
1
costs) 
I 
1,124 fatal injuries at $5,000 each / $5,620,000 
51,253 nonfatal injuries at $100 each I 5,125,300 
I 
Total Direct Costs I $10,745,300 
39. 
2. Indirect Costs (4 times direct costs) 
3. Wage losses 
(Average daily wage of $10 - Compen-
sation Payments:) 
1$42,981,200 
I 76,796,700 
I 
$130,523,220 
22 
From the foregoing it can be 
aside from the humanitarian angle, bas 
I 
seen that the public, 
I 
a definite economic 
interest in the safety programs in the coal Jines. 
I 
The ratio between the number of me i employed 
and the number of deaths and injuries shows ~ hat one man 
out of every e igbt employed will be killed or injured in 
a years time, or that, on an average, every J ight years 
a number equal to all the miners are killed ~r injured. 
I 
Fifty per cent of the accidents will come fr t m roof and 
rib falls, thirty per cent from haulage acci~ents, and 
twenty per ent from other causes. According !to studies 
by the Federal Bureau of Mines, the approximate number of 
days lost for the various types of injuries *re as follows: 
1. Partial Disability Accidents-- t --659 days 
2. Temporary Disability Accidents j -- 41 days. 
These figures represent the experience of the various 
I State Department of Compensation as to the average time 
that the injured is not employable at any tyke of employ-
ment. 
I 22.) Mines Circular 47 of U.S.Bureau of Mines, the Depart-
ment of the Interior 1946. P• 21 
40. 
The foregoing pages have shown the compelling 
need for safety regulations and improvement f working 
places for the miners. The United 
hold the position that legislation is necess 
the mine owners have had sufficient opportun 
conditions and have failed. 
of America 
because 
to better 
In this question as any other it is not the law 
alone but the quality of enforcement that is ost import-
ant. It is on this point the United Mine wo of 
America have disagreed with the various states. The union 
contends that the laws per se are adequate b t that en-
forcement is hampered by politics. The foll wing statement 
of Mr. Lewis expresses their feelings on this point. Mr. 
Lewis said: "Long experience has demonstrate that the 
coal companies are able to contribute to pol tical cam-
paigns for incumbent and state administratio9s and have 
more influence than the miners with respect Jlo law enforce-
23 
ment in the mines." It would appear to the author that 
there is some truth to these accusations. T~ following 
pages will present some testimony on this po 
2.) Much of the ss.f.e,:ty legislation reg coal 
mining has been passed by State Legislatures 
forced by State agencies. The earliest safe y legisla-
23.) Testimony of John L. Lewis before the ubcommittee 
of the senate Committee on Public Lands, Apr~ l 17, 1947. 
P• 83. u. s. Government Printing Office, Wa hington, D. C. 
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I 
tion was passed by the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1869. 
I 
This legislation set minimum safety standard~ and created 
the Pennsylvania Bureau of Mines to enforce J hem. Other 
I 
coal-mining states passed safety legislation /in the suc-
ceeding years, and established enforcement a ~encies. The 
present Pennsylvania mining laws are conside f ed by mining 
I 
experts to be the most comprehensive of all the laws and I . 
have served as a model for several other sta r es. 
The scope of this discussion is to evaluate the 
I quality of enforcement rather than the techn~cal points 
I 
of the various and sundry state laws. The laws are ade-
/ qua te but the adequacy of enforcement is sub,ject to doubt 
as the following pages show. I 
I 
I The following statement was made b,y the mine 
inspector of the district in wnich the Cent~alia, Illinois 
I 
explosion, killing 111 men, took place on Ma:r.eh 25, 1947. 
I 
"While all the coal operators in the State i ave enjoyed 
immunity from law enforcement, the major companies enjoyed 
I 
I 
the most, as brought out by my testimony before the Senate 
committee. Tne Peabody and Old Ben Coal Co~ . had their 
I 
mines in Franklin County taken away from Inf pector James 
Wilson because he wanted them cleaned up an~ placed in 
safe condition. I 
"The Centralia Coal Co. enjoyed mlore immunity 
I 
than any other company in my district. Per
1
haps one reason 
for this is that when Medil~ (Director, Il ~inois Dep't of 
I 
42.. 
I 
I 
I 
• I Mines and Minerals) was up for reappointment fn 1945 and 
the miners were opposed to his reappointment, / the Centra-
lia Coal Co. came to his support and endorsed11 him for 24 
reappointment • •• I 
An article in the "st. Louis Post-~ispatch" 
of March 19, 1947 stated that Mine Inspector lscanlan, tbe 
I 
appointee .of Governor Green of Illinois, asselrted that 
I 
the quota at the Republican State Conrrni ttee ~n Illinois 
I 
assigned to the mi ne owners was $25 1 000 for ~be campaign 
I 
last fall; tha t the small mine owners were expected to 
donate $100 and larger operators $1,000. I 
Perhaps the reader will say that t J is is a case 
I 
of a man trying to justify his deficiencies ~ut there is 
I 
evidence of discrepancies in enforcement. G9vernor Green 
I dismissed Robert M. Madill from his job as Dfrector of 
Mines and Minerals a rew days arter the Centt alia disaster 
in March, 1947 • 1 
Mr. Melvin Price, a Representative / in Congress 
I from Illinois, said: "The record of mine fa r alities year 
after year clearly reflects the laxity of St~ te enforce-
1 25 
· ment and the inadequacies of state safety la~s." 
I 
Tbe amount of appropriat i on is another evidence 
I 
I 
24.) Statement of Driscoll o. Scanlan befo~e Illinois 
U,gislature Committee at Centralia, Illlnois, April 
24, 1947. I 
25.) Hearings before House of Representati~es Subcommittee 
on Miner's Welfare of The Committee on Educ~tion and 
Labor, June 16, 1949. P• 3. · 1 
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I 
I 
I 
- I 
that some states believe wild-life conservation is more 
important than the saving of miners' lives. /rn 1940~ Ill-
1 
inois had an appropriation of $320~000 for t he State Min-
ing Department. This departme~t employed 16 / inspectors for 
I 
45~000 coal miners. The same year, they had / 147 game ward-
ens and an appropriation of $1,888~ooo. I 
I 
West Virginia mines employed 102~ 7
1
5o men in 
I 
1946 and had 32 mine inspectors with an appr'opriation of 
I $246,000. The State emplpyed 59 game warde 1s with an 
appropriation of $334~699. Ohio's appropriation for safety 
I 
in 1940 was $54~000 and their wild-life app~opriation 
$144~660. I 
I 
The State of Pennsylvania employi~g 195~000 
I 
men in the anthracite and bituminous coal mJnes has 55 
mine inspectors. This is the state which if supposed to 
I 
have the best laws and enforcement of any s r ate. Yet, in 
I proportion to the number of miners, :tt is little better 
bne may wonder than west Virginia as regards inspectors. 
why the number of inspectors is important. Let us take 
e. case. According to the Bureau of Mines, /there are 2171 
I 
active bituminous coal mines in Pennsylvan1a, which are 
inspected by 28 inspectors. These men hav1 a maximum of 
7~000 inspection days per year. Assuming ~ ver·y conserve-
r 
tive average ofl 2 days per inspection per mine, these men 
could make 1.6 inspections per mine per ye l r or one in-
spection every seven and a half months. 
44. 
Tbe Pennsylvania State Industrial dommission 
I 
lists 1, 587 death and total disability cases land approxi-
mately 80,000 temporary disability cases, in lthe years 
1941-1946, in the bituminous coal fields alo4e. It would 
seem that even semi-annual inspection is not sufficient 
to maintain adequate safety standards. 
It is a sad commentary on the state's enforce-
! 
ment of safety legislation when the most progressive state, 
Pennsylvania, maintains at best a semi-annuai inspection. 
I 
Instances of politics in mining departments such as that 
I 
outlined in the Centralia testimony and the ~eneral lax-
ness in enforcement have led the United Mine / Workers to 
action on the federal government level for s~fety legis-
lation. I 
I 3.) The Federal Government's role in s~fety legis-
[ 
lation in the coal mines, began with the est;ablishment 
I 
of the U ~ s. Bureau of Mines by an Act of Cd,ngress, May 6, 
I 
1910. Its purpose according to the Act was [to include 
I 
the testing of fuels and investigations of mine explosions, 
I 
to prepare and publish reports of inquiries ,I and to include 
I 
investigations of the methods of mining, especially in 
I 
I 
relation to the safety of miners, improvement of the con-
I 
I ditlons, use of explosives and electricity ~nd the pre-
vention of accidents. / 
In 1913 the Act was amended and Section 2 pro-
' 
vides for preparation of repo~ts with.appro~riate recom-
45. 
mendations concerning the nature, causes, and prevention 
I 
of accidents with special reference to healt h . 
I 
The Bureau of Mines from 1910 to 1$40 acted 
I 
largely in an advisory capacity to the varier s state 
bureaus of mines. The Bureau of Mines concentrated on 
I 
safety instruction and mine rescue training, / and did many 
I investigat i ons into the cause of accidents, particularly 
I 
explo"s.i ons. Many safety devices were developed during 
I 
this period as a result of these research acltivities. 
I 
Results wer.e lirni ted however because The Bu~eau of Mines 
I 
could recommend but not enforce. The Unite~ Mine Workers 
were active during this period in support o1 any proposed 
legislation that would increase the efficacy of the Bureau. 
I 
An example of this activity was their suppoJ t of the Neely 
. I 
Bill - S2420, 1fitroduced in Congress in 1946, which would 
I have authorized the Bureau of Mines to conduct regular 
. . I 
inspections of the coal mines to obtain information relat-
1 
ing to health and safety conditions. I Despipe the miners' 
I 
active support, the Bureau of Mines was lit~ le changed in 
I 
the period of 1910 to 1940. In 1941, the Se venty-seventh 
Congress began hearings on a bill to increalse the Bureau 1 s 
powers. 
I 
I 
I 
The Coal Mine Inspection Branch dr the Health 
I 
and Safety Division, Bureau of Mines, was J stablished 
to carry out an Act of Congress of May 7, 1941, known as 
Public Law 49, Seventy-seventh Congress H.f . 2092. Under 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
I 
I 
the provisions in the act~ the Secretary of ]nterior~ 
I 
acting through the Bureau of Mines~ is authorized and 
I 
empowered to make annual or necessary inspecyions and 
. I . 
investigations in coal mines. The object of 1these inspeo-
1 
tiona is to reduce mine accidents by determiming the 
I 
causes of unhealthy or unsafe conditions~ actidents or 
occupational diseases in coal mines~ and maki ng recommen-
1 dations for their prevention. Insofar as Puplic Law 49 
I 
is concerned~ compliance with the Federal inr pectors' 
reconnnendations is not mandatory. It must br _remembered 
that under this law~ a Federal inspection report possessed 
I 
no other power than moral suasion; enforcemert rested 
I 
solely with the respective state mining depalrtment. 
I 
The United Mine workers reacted f~vorably to 
this law~ which was a partial answer to the /pressing needs 
. I 
of safety. The following paragraph is an e~cerpt from the 
Joint Report of the International Officers 1o the Thirty-
seventh Constitutional Convention of the Un f ted Mine 
Workers of America~ 1942. 1 
I 
"The reports of the (Federal) inspections thus 
I 
far made~ covering the first eight months, ~re proof posi-
1 
tive that the inspectors are proceeding in ~ heir work with 
I 
an unusual degree of sincerity, energy, and ' practical 
ability •••• Your officers are glad to join with our local 
unions and the great majority of safety-min~ed coal oper-
1 
ators in praising the inspection work to da/te." 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
On May 29, 1946, after government ~eizure of 
I 
the coal mines, an agreement was executed be~ween the 
I 
United Mine Workers of America and the Coal Mine Adminis-
1 
trator, J. A. Krug, designed to cover the conditions of 
I 
work and employment during the period of government oper-
1 
ation. From section 2 of this Agreement evo+ved The Federal 
I Mine Safety Code for Bituminous-Coal and Ligt ite Mines 
of the United States. The code was comprehemsive and I ' 
well-written and seemed to be a step forward / in acci-
dent-prevention. The code has been incorpor~ted in the 
I 
I 
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements of f947, 1948 
and 1950. These agreements added to the prof isions of 
the codes, which were incorporated, the establishment of 
I 
a Joint Industry Safety Committee. This combittee, com-
1 
posed of four members, consults with the Bureau of Mines 
I 
on matters of review and revision. I 
I 
The Federal mine inspectors still have only 
I 
the powers of moral suasion. "In the first lsix years 
I 
of operation under the 1941 Act, from Decem't1er 1, 1941 
I 
to June 30, 1947, the management's record o~ compliance 
was only 25 per cent. From July 1, 1947 to 1June. 30, 1948, 
with the Federal Mine Safety Code in effect ~ the record 
26 
of compliance was only 41 per cent." I 
I 
26.) Bureau of Mines Quarterly Report toT~ Secretary 
of Tbe Interior, September 15, 1948. P • 4 • i 
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I 
Seven State agencies ignored the p~ovisions of 
Public Law 328 (Federal Mine Safety Code) in 11947 and 
refused to submit reports of act i on to the Bdderal Bureau 
I
I of Mines. They are: 
State Agency: 
Alabama 
Arkansas 
Georgia 
Iowa 
North Dakota 
Pennsylvania 
Wyoming 
States: 
Virginia 
Utah 
TABLE VI. I 
Violations of Public Law 328. 
Inspections 
81 
19 
2 
20 
3 
465 
41 
77 
Violations 
1,184 
317 
152 
16 
4,071 
237 
1,661 
Remarks 
No Report of 
Corrective 
Action 
Do 
Do 
Do 
Do 
Do 
2 reports 
I . 
42 271 1 3 reports 
source: Quarterly Report of the Bureau of ~ines to the 
Eightieth Congress, September 30, ~948, p. 5. 
The lack of co-operation and comp ~iance with 
the Federal inspection system has led ~arioJs Congressmen 
and the United Mine Workers of America to d~mand legis-
lation giving the Federal inspectors power 1f enforcement. 
The following are some facts showing that F~deral inspec-
1 
tion has, despite ne gative reactions accomplished some 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
49. 
results. The average fatality rate in the P~ nnsylvania 
bituminous field for 1935 to 1941 was 1.05 pJ r million 
I 
man hours. This was prior to Federal inspec r ion. In 
the period of Federal inspection, 1942 to 1948, the fatal-
ity rate was reduced to .83 on the average. \This was 
during a period of greater exposure than the 1935 to 1941 
period. 
The United Mine Workers have favorJ d Federal 
I inspection because of grea t er uniformity of ~ nforcement 
I 
and administration. They have supported sue~ billa as 
I H.R. 3023 in 1949 and Senate :&ill 1031. These laws were 
I designed to give the Federa l Inspectors the power of en-
1 
forcement. These bills were not passed but t he union 
continues to fight for safety legislation. Lewis, reflec-
1 
ting the feelings of the miners testified: r we hope the 
Congress will make good its promise, which i ~ gave the 
I 
coal miners of this country, that if the States would l 27 
not protect them, the Federal Government wout d·" 
I 27.) Testimony of John L. Lewis before the ~ubcommittee 
of the Committee on Public Lands, Eightieth Congress, 
June 5, 19471 P• 121. u.s. Governnent Prin~ing Office. 
I 
I 
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Chapter IV. 
HEALTH AND WELFARE. 
I 
The health and living conditions ofr the men, 
I -
women, and children of America who depend diiectly for 
I their sustenance and welfare upon the coal-mining indus-
try are matters of national concern. This k~l y industry 
affects directly the progress and prosperity of all Ameri-
1 can industry because its product, coal, is i~dispensable. 
A changing world has bypassed many coal mine~s with re-
spect to medical, housing, and sanitary faci t ities. The 
isolation and transient character of many m1~1ng towns 
, I 
has increased the amount of low standard medical, housing, 
and sanitary facilities of many coal miners. 
1.) The Krug-Lewis Agreement of 1946 ircluded two 
clauses relating to safety, health, ~nd welf~re. The 
first created a Welfare and Retirement Fund ~hile the 
second authorized a "comprehensive survey ana study of 
I the hospital and medical facilities, medical[ treatment, 
sanitary, and housing conditions in the coall mining areas. 
I The purpose of this survey will be to deterjine the charac-
ter and scope of improvements which should b~ made to 
I provide the mine workers of the Nation with redical, hous-
ing and sanitary facilities conformint to relcognized 
2s 1 
American standards •" 1 
I 
28.) Krug-Lewis Agreement May 29, 1946, Wa~hington, D.c. 
Section 4. 1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I Rear Admiral Joel T. Boone of the Njvy Medical 
Corps was placed in charge of the survey, and[ for his staff 
chose a number of Navy personnel so as to insbre the maxi-
mum of impartiality. Since it was impossible \ to make a 
study of each of the 8,000 mines in the United States, 
260 mines, employing 71,850 men, were se lecteh at random. 
Representatives of Management and Labor asser~ed that 
conditions at the 260 mines could be considert d represent-
ative of those throughout the industry. I 
The report, "A Medical Survey of the Bituminous-
Coal Industry", submitted by Admiral Boone to \ the Secre-
tary of the Interior on March 17, 1947, prese b ts the find-
ings of the field teams. The statements tbat \have been 
made regarding conditions were based upon statistical 
evidence and the personal observations of the [Medical 
Survey Group, qualified and trained in making lappraisals 
within their own professional fields. To this end the 
report is a fair appraisal of the socio-econo~ic back-
ground to the coal miners • I 
"In 'Coalville', u.s.A., many of the sore spots, 
the decrepit h ouses, and the disease-breeding lprivies 
that were the despair of earnest reformers eat lier in the 
present century, have persistently survived. !That they 
are anarchronistic in a day that boasts innumberable testi-
monials to the march of science tends to inte4sify the 
reality of the deficiencies. .That they exist [in shocking 
I 
I 
52. 
contrast to modern sanitary, well-maintained :communities 
stigmatizes not only the backward coal mine 
29 
dpera tors but 
I 
the whole industry." I 
I To a great extent, greater probabl~ than in any 
other occupation in the United States, the b ~tuminous 
coal miners are dependent upon their employe ~s for the 
character of the houaes in which they live. I The Survey 
. I 
found that only 10% of the company-owned hou~es had bath-
rooms and that 35% of these houses were strudturally ade-
1 
quate. The average age of the houses surveyJd was 30 
I 
years with 95% of the house built of wood. 0nly 50% of 
I 
the houses had running water and 58.3% lacke4 any means 
30 I 
of sewage disposal. It is evident from th7 foregoing 
paragraphs that many coal miners lack adequa t e housing 
and sanitation facilities. These conditions lare not con-
I 
ducive · to good health and may impair the recpvery and 
rehabilitation of disability cases. [ 
The remoteness of many mining commynities with 
limited communication to other settled areas l have compelled 
I 
employers to institute prepayment plans for ~dical ce.re. 
I These plans provide for payments by the subslcriber of 
through periodic, regular deduction from hisi wages. The 
average payment per month is $1.36 for the Jnmarried sub-
1 
I 29.) United States Department of the Interior- "A Medic-
al survey of the Bituminous-Coal Industry" ~947, p. 13. 
30.) Ibid PP• 20, 29, 40, 45. I 
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I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
scriber and $2.00 for the married subscriber jwith depend-
1 
I 
ents. In return for this, the physician pro~ides dispen-
1 
sary service with simple medications furnish~ d free. 
I 
I Obstetrical service, treatment of veneral di$eases, and 
I 
I 
medicines given by injection are excluded fr f m the plan 
but are usually given at extra charge by the / physician. 
Some 70 per cent of the mines surveyed had s uch prepayment 
I 
plans. The quality and character of the med/ical facilities 
I 
provided have been a point of contention be "l1ween the ma.n-
1 
I 
agements and labor. The contract for providing medical 
Oral agreemenlt care generally consisted of an between the 
management and the physician. The physicial s were not 
I 
selected primarily on the basis of professipnal qualifi-
1 
cations but on the basis of friendship and bther non-medi-
cal considerations. The Survey found many ~aults with 
I 
I 
the prepayments in existence and recommende/d that: "The 
I 
participating physician should be paid fro~ a fund centrally 
I 
I 
administered by a nonprofit agency or assoqiation, on the 
I 
basis of specific services performed, or, where necessary 
I 
or desirable, on a salary. Appropriate checks must be 
I 
included within the plans 
31 
dulgent physicians." 
to prevent abuse s by over-in-
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
The miners, in general depend upbn hospitals 
I 
I 
smaller than average in size for hospital lcare. Seventy 
I 
31.) Ibid P• 135. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I, 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
I 55~ I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
per cent of the hospitals used ·primarily by t /he coal miners 
I 
are less than 150-bed size. Seventy-five pe ~ cent of the 
I 
I 
hospitals are inadequate with regard to one dr more of the 
I 
I 
following: Surgical rooms, delivery rooms arid nurseries, 
clinical laboratories, and X-ray facilities. 
The foregoing pages have shown the inadequacies 
of the prepayment plans for medica~ care and hospitali-
' I 
zation. These plans vary from company to company but the 
I 
I 
majority are inadequate from the viewpoint o~ the physician 
I 
I 
and the patient. I 
I 
I General medical care for employees, and their 
I 
I dependents is not generally considered to b, an obligation 
of the companies. However, provisions for fedical care for 
I industrial accidents and occupational diseases is clearly 
I 
I 
a financial responsibility of management and bas been spe-
. I 
cifically indicated by most of the State compensation laws. 
I 
The bituminous-coal-mining industry has lagked in its 
I 
appreciation and utilization of adequate me jdical programs 
I 
for its workers. The Medical Survey studieid the industri-
1 
I 
al medicine programs of the coal industry gnd made the 
I 
following findings and conclusions. I 
I 
I 
"In the coal industry, where working conditions 
I 
I 
are among the most hazardous and where serious traumatic 
I 
I 
injuries occur, the prevention and treatmeht of surgical 
I 
I 
shock are vi tally important. Seventy-two per cent of the 
I 
I 
surveyed mines are inadequately prepared t /o render emer-
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
gency medical care to the seriously injured. Early treat-
ment of surgical shock is essential~ for the longer it is 
I delayed the more critical the degree of shoclf becomes. 
I 
I It is estimated that in most instances an injured miner 
I is transported from the worki ng face of the ~ne to the 
I 
surface and retransported from the portal to) the nearest 
I 
I 
hospital in a bout 2 hours or less. Where ade:quate facil-
1 
I 
ities for emergency treatment are not avail~ble~ this 
I 
element of dele.y results in serious conseque:nces, oc ca-
1 
I 
sionally terminating in fatality. ---It is feasible and 
I 
essential, however~ that all mines establis ~ and equip 
I 
I 
adequate first aid facilities. --- I 
'There are, undoubtedly, many diseases that are 
I 
I 
acquired by coal miners in their environmen~ thay may be 
I 
. I 
considered occupational in nature. The sc91pe of this 
I 
I 
survey did not allow investigation and tho~ough review 
I 
I 
of all diseases that may be directly or inqirectly associ-
/ 
a ted with the coal miners' working environf ent. It is 
I 
recognized that insufficient attention has 1 been paid to 
I 
I 
this subject by t he industry and associatetl medical per-
sonnel • ••• 
I 
I 
I 
I I. 
'Recognition of the value of in~ustrial hygiene 
I 
and medicine by Labor and Management and the general appli-
1 
I 
cation of research and study, over a period of years, by 
I 
the medical professiao ~ will reveal the causes, nature. 
I 
I 
and means of preventing occupational diseases and injuries. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
In turn, these will bring immeasurable benef~ts to the 
I 32 
health, welfare, and happiness of the coal m~ner." 
. I 
2.) On May 29, 1946, the Krug-Lewis Ag:qeement created 
I 
a Welfare and Retirement Fund, and established a royalty of 
I 
I 5 cents per ton of coal mines for its support. Even with 
I 
the Governments contractual obligation, the tund did not 
I 
begin to function until April, 1947, then only on a limited 
I 
I 
scale. The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of July 
I 
7, 1947 confirmed the Welfare and Retirement / Fund and 
I 
raised the royalty from 5 to 10 cents per toh. Under the 
I 
I 
1947 contract, the United Mine Workers of America Welfare 
I 
I 
and Retirement Fund was set up as an irrevoc~ble trust to 
I 
be operated by a board of three trustees. qne trustee 
I 
was to be appointed by the Employer, one by lthe United 
I 
I Mine Workers, and one to be a neutral truste:e, appointed 
I 
by tbe other two trustees. A series of law~ uits by Ezra 
van Horn, Operator Trustee, prevented disbuf sement of 
funds until the Goldsborough decision on June 28, 1948 
I 
activated the fund and approved the pension /plan. 
The National Bituminous Coal Wage !Agreement of 
I 
1948, signed on July 1, 1948, confirmed the i Fund and raised 
I 
I 
the royalty to 20 cents per ton. The opera~or's trustee 
I 
was Ezra Van Horn, John L. Lewis as the *inr rs trustee and 
H. styles Bridges as the neutral trustee. !These trustees 
I 
I 
I 
32.) Ibid pp 134-135. [ 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
appointed Miss Josephine Roche as Director of l the Fund 
I 
I 
I 
and established the present organization. 
The organization is headed by the ~ustees, who 
I 
established all policy and the regulations b~ which the 
I 
work of the Fund is carried on. The Chairman of the Fund; is 
I 
I subject to the authority of the Trustees. 
I 
I The Director of the Fund is responsible for the 
day to day direction of the Funds work, for l pproval of 
I 
I 
all disbursement, for personnel, and for the Jgeneral super-
1 
I 
vision of all of the Funds various inter-related services. 
I 
I 
Under the general ~upervision, the / Fund func-
1 
tions through 6 services - Death Benefits, ~dical, Health 
I 
and Hospitalization, Disability and Widows' ~ssistance 
I 
I 
Benefits, Fiscal, Pensions, Statistics and ~esearch. 
I 
I Supervisors of Disability and Wid9ws• Assistance 
I 
Benefits service, Pens.ion service and Death I Benefits Ser-
1 
vice are responsible for the examination and reviewing of 
I 
. I 
all applications for benefits, and they approve payments 
I 
of benefits to applicants who are determinea eligible 
I 
under the standards and regula tiona of the /Trustees. The 
I Executive Medical Officer is responsible f9r the Medical, 
I 
Health and Hospital Service operating through a headquar-
1 
ters staff and ten area medical offices. I ':the Comptroller 
I 
I is responsible for all fiscal matters, acc~unting for all 
disbursements and reports. The Supervisor / of Research and 
I 
Statistics is responsible . for tabulation of all operating 
I 
I 
I 
I 
5S. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
statistics and the co-ordination of records ard information. 
Counsel to the Trustees is legal ad~iser for the 
I 
I 
Fund and performs such legal services as may be requested. 
I 
I 
Most of the field work as regards alpplications 
I 
for disability and pension grants are handleq by the dis-
1 
I 
I trict officials of the u. M. W. 
STA 'IE 
ALABAMA 
ARKANSAS 
COLORADO 
ILLINOIS 
INDIANA 
IOWA 
KANSAS 
KENTUCKY 
MARYLAND 
MICHIGAN 
MISSOURI 
Table VII. 
I 
I 
I 
TONNAGE COLLECTIONS BY STATES ! 
I 
JULY l, 1948 TO JUNE 30, 1949 1 
AMOUNT STATE 1 
$ 2,972,747.64 
283,138.66 
996,554.62 
10,152,898.08 
4,699,678.74 
70,166.25 
508,997.64 
6,185,809.88 
308,257.32 
806.40 
513,046.68 
MONTANA I I 
I 
I 
NEW MEXICO I 
I 
I OHIO 
OKLAHOMA I 
I 
PENNSYLVANIIA 
TENNESSEE 
UTAH 
VIRGINIA 
WASHINGTON 
I 
W. VIRGINIA 
WYOMING 
TOTAL 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
AMOUNT 
$ 122,991.89 
256,894.60 
10,568,248.75 
267,542.90 
26,376,013.55 
1, 625,038.89 
1,360,474.39 
3,512,896.57 
218,041.77 
18,816,745.55 
1,074,915.10 
$90,891,905.87 
source: Report of the United Mine Workers pf America 
I 
welfare and Retirement Fund, Aggust, 1949. / 
There was a balance of $42,959,6~8.61 resulting 
from the accrual of funds froz~n by litiga t ion in 1947. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
- I 
This made the funds available for disbursemenr a total 
of over $143,000,000 million dollars. As Tab:le VII shows, 
. . I 
I four states, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and West Vir-
1 
. I 
ginia, contributed 69% of the total collected!. The total 
I 
collected is a sizeable sum to be handled by !trusteeship. 
I 
Table VIII. / 
I 
I DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFIT PAYMENTS BY STATES. 
State 
ALABAMA $ 
ARKANSAS 
COLORADO 
ILLINOIS 
INDIANA 
IOWA 
KANSAS 
KENTUCKY 
MARYLAND 
MISSOURI 
MONTANA 
I 
I (July 1, 1948 to June 30, 1949) 1 
Total 
5,184,636.47 
681,427.16 
1,905,860.77 
8,455,630.60 
4,744,901.15 
1,493,505.11 
506,785.55 
12,321,296.16 
687,187.36 
419,861.15 
480,916.80 
State 
NEW MEXICO 
OHIO 
OKLAHOMA 
PENNSYLVANIA 
TENNESSEE 
TEXAS 
UTAH 
VIRGINIA I I 
I WASHINGTON I 
I 
I 
Total 
/$ 57,162.48 
I 6,038,897.29 I 
I 
I 595,075.25 
I 
26,749,337.22 
4, 019,621.47 
37,401.81 
74ii,998.76 
2,788,889.53 
339,257.00 
WEST VIRGINI4 25,604,861.23 
. I 
WYOMING I 937,075.63 
I 
MISCELLANEOUS 87,199.22 
I 
TOTAL I I $lo4,88o, 785.17 
I 
Source: Report of the United Mine Workers ~f America 
I 
Welfare and Retirement Fund, August 1949. 1 
The distribution of benefit payme/nts by states 
I 
shows approximately the same distribution ,s the collec-
I 
I 
I 
tions. The states which accounted for 69% of / the payments 
received about 66% of the benefits. The sout~ern states 
accounted for a slightly higher total -of paymr nts than 
they collected. I 
Expenditures through the Death Bene~ it Service 
I 
from .July 1, 1948 to .June 30, 1949 was $5,54~1 853. When 
. I 
a mine worker is killed in the mine, or dies as a result 
I 
of injury or illness, his widow receives a $~1 000 Death 
Benefit Gratuity. The records of the FUnd t~ .June 30, 1949 
I 
show that 31,958 widows and dependents have l eceived this 
gratuity since the Fund began. The average , ge at death of 
mine workers, whose dependents the Fund aided, was 55.8 
I 
years as compared with 64.2 years, which 1s t he avers.ge 
age at death for the country as a whole. I Th, death rate 
I 
of coal miners was 15.1 per 1,000 as compared to 10.3 for 
I 
the country. I I 
Coal Mine accidents alone were responsible for 
I 
5 deaths per 1,000, and 52% of the miners kil led were under 
I 
40 years of age. Killings in the mines averaged more than 
I The excessive toll of 1,200 per year from 1930 to 1949. 
I younger men which coal mining exacted is shor n by the fact 
that 42% of the deaths of the men under 25 w~ re due to 
I 
I 
occupational causes. 
The Disability and Widows' Assistalnce section 
I 
disbursed $64,206 1 596 in the year ended Jun~ 30, 1949. 
This disbursement was not related merely t o /the needs of I . 
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the 12 month period but went back to the early 30' a in 
many cases. The eligibility of the applicants for widow's 
assistance was determined on the local level and no re-
strictions were placed by the trustees on the period of 
time for eligibility. Thus any living widows or possible 
dependents were eligible for the assistance. Disability 
benefits provided a maximum of $60 per month for the dis-
abled miner, $20 for his wife, and $10 for each child. 
From the maximum allowable amounts, deductions were made 
of money received from Social Security Old Age and Sur-
vivors' Insurance, Workmen's Compensation, and any regu-
lar income. 
There were 292,911 beneficiaries of the Fund's 
Disability and Widows Assistance grants in the year ended 
June 30, 1949. 84,625 disabled miners -77.1% of them 
permanently disabled -and their wives and children;30,583 
widows and their children, make up this total. These 
grants cannot exceed twelve months and are subject to 
constant revision or cancellation. 
The pension expenditures were $30,366,264~· More 
than two years elapsed after the principle of retirement 
benefits was accepted by contract agreement, May 29, 1946, 
until the first pension payment on September 9,1948. 
Retroactive payment to applicants, providing they rettred 
after May 28, 1936, accounted for more than 50% of this 
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$30,366,264. Pension payments of $100 a month were author-
ized for 23,642 men with 18,206 dependents - a total of 
41,848 beneficiaries. Of these 23,642 pensioners, over 
50% were permanently disabled. The average age of retire-
ment was 66.1 with 70% over the retirement age of 62. The 
average years of service was 39 with only 13% having as 
few as _20 years of service. 
because they were laid off. 
Some 34% of these men retired 
Only 9% of the men retired to 
avail themselves of the pension. 
Late in the fall of 1948, following the appoint-
ment of Doctor Warren F. Draper as Executive Medical 
Officer of the Fund, the Medical, Health, and Hospital 
Service was established. By January, 1949 ten area medical 
offices covering the 26 bituminous coal mining states were 
established and physicians were placed in charge of them. 
The area medical administrators were responsible for work-
ing out with hospitals and physicians in their areas, 
arrangements for me dical and hospital care for U.M.W.A. 
members at a reasonable cost. E~enditures for the Medical, 
Health, and Hospital Service for the 12 months, ending 
June 30, 1949, was $4,761,071 with 26,480 miners or depend-
ents having received hospital and medical care. 
In s ummary, the Fund expended $104,880, 785 in 
the year ended June 30, 1949 and aided 393,097 people in 
26 states. This was accomplished with a total adminis-
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trative cost of 1.4% or $1,535,933.06. Included in the 
administrative cost are the Trustees' allowances. The 
Fund's unexpended balance as of June 30, 1949 was 
$29,424,705.28 with no unpaid obligations or commitments. 
The United Mine Workers of America Welfare and 
Retirement Fund suspe_nded operation for a short period 
in the fall of 1949 because of delinquencies in the oper-
ators' payments. Many of the sme.ller · operators suspended 
payments during the fall and winter of 1949 due to labor 
troubles. The disbursements exceeded the income because 
of this delinquencies in payments during this period. 
However, in the year 1950, the income has exceeded the 
disbursements. 
The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 
1950, excuted March 5, 1950, provided for several changes 
in :the· payments to and organization of the Fund. 'J;hese 
were: 1.} The royalty was increased from 20 to 30 cents 
per ton of coal mined. 2.) The appointment of Charles 
A. Owen as the Operator's Trustee, John L. Lewis as the 
Union's Trustee, and Miss Josephine Roche as the Neutral 
Trustee. 
The Welfare and Retirement Fund had a balance of 
$57,000,000 as of December 1, 1950. The Fund has met the 
needs of the miners and no doubt will continue to be a part 
of any collective bargaining in the coal~mining industry. 
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Chapter v. 
MECHANIZATION. 
1.) Unions are as appreciative as moat other groups 
of the benefits of improved processes to the general public. 
At the same time the unions ba ve recognized the dangers of 
technological unemployment and have adopted various "con-
trol policies". One long advocated policy was control of 
the rate of introduction of new machinery. John Mitchell 
said that it was the duty of the employer "to make alter-
ations gradually, so as to extend the effect of the change 
over a aeries of years, and thus permit the workmen to 
33 
accomodate themselves to the new conditions." This 
policy has been incorporated into the collective bargain-
ing in the mens' clothing industry. It is not without 
merit as it may avoid abrupt changes in employment. 
Another "control policy" is the controlling of 
work loads, a good example of which is found in the rail-
road industry. The industry feels that it is no longer 
necessary to employ a fireman in the "cab" of Diesel loco-
motives. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and En-
ginemen have staged a vigorous campaign against this idea 
and have achieved limited success. In the textile indus-
try the union has tried to restrict the number of spinn-
ing machines that a man may tend. These are but a few of 
33.) "Organized Labor" by John Mitche 11, 1903, p. 249 
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the many methods for the controlling of work load. In 
many cases, the policy results in the hiring of useless 
and unnecessary labor. Just how widespread this "make-
work" program is, it is hard to say but the Taft-Hartley 
Act considered it important enough to outlaw it as an un-
fair labor practice. 
None of the above-mentioned practices nave been 
utilized by the United Mine Workers to offset technological 
unemployment. The u. M. W. has used the argument that 
greater efficiency makes possible higher wages and shorter 
hours for the miners. So the u. M. w. has fostered greater 
efficiency rather than opposing mechanization and its 
attendant technological unemployment. The feelings. of the 
United Mine Workers regarding mechan i zation is reflected 
by a statement of John L. Lewis in an interview with a 
magazine editor. Mr. Lewis said: "Mechanization is im-
perative not only in the mining industry but in all otber 
induatries of like nature. The United Mine Workers recog-
nized three or four decades ago that the only way to in-
crease the standard of living in the mining industry was 
to create new values by greater productivity-more tons per 
34 
day per man." 
John OWens, Secretary-Treasurer of the United 
Mine workers, reflected the same reasoning as Mr. Lewis 
34.) "Pensions: The Coming Issue in Le.bor Relations", 
u. s. News and World Report, November 19, 1948. p. 37. 
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in an interview with the author when be stated that mech-
anization is essential to a competitive industry. Mr. 
Owens doubted that any great technological unemployment 
would result from greatly-increased mechanization. He 
said that mechanization would improve the competitive 
position of coal in regard to the other fuels - gas and 
fuel oil and make possible enlarged demand and employment. 
There is resistance to further mechanization by 
some of the rank and file of the u. M. w. but the officials 
hold to the principles of John Mitchell, that an increased 
standard of living can be achieved only by greater pro-
ductivity. That is the long-run view of the officials 
but they do act to prevent technological unemployment in 
the short periods of time. 
The United Mine Workers started a study of the 
problems arising from mechanization of bituminous mines 
on June 8, 1937. The conclusions of the study are as 
follows. 
"1. That there is a wide enough margin in cost reduction 
due to mechanical loading to allow participation in the 
benefits; 
2. That a high day-rate is inadequate without a guaranteed 
number of working days per year, or guaranteed annual earn-
ings; 
3. That the displacement of labor is proceeding at a rate 
necessitating a definite form of protection (insurance, 
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dismissal wage 1 etc.)...... It is believed that such a 
study should be continued and all facts and problems aris-
ing from the extended mechanization should be continually 
gathered and analyzed as a guide in shaping the policies 
35 
and tactics of the u. M. w •• •• 
The tactics of the United Mine Workers that 
have been employed are: 
1. The reduction of the retirement age to 60 
under the Welfare and Retirement Fund. The Social Security 
Administration reported that in 1947, 11% of the miners 
were 60 years of age or over and over 50% over 50 years of 
age. Thus by reducing the retirement age~ the labor supply 
would be lessened without displacement. 
2. The establishment of thirty-five hours as 
the standard work week. By lessening the hours, the union 
hopes to keep the employment levels higher. The United 
Mine workers Journal expresses the belief that increased 
efficiency in the coal industry has come about because of 
the policy of the United Mine Workers and the pressure 
constantly on the industry to mechanize to absorb new costs 
coming from higher wages and shorter hours. The Journal 
believes that the problem of technological unemployment is 
not insurmountable because the diminution of manpower could 
35.) Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth Constitutional Con-
vention of the United Mine Workers of America, February 3 1 
19381 Volume I, PP. 25-26 
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come through failure to employ new men rather than the dis-
charging of present employees. This would be feasible due 
to the constant diminution of existing personnel through the 
processes of the industry itself. 
The United Mine workers continue to hold to the 
policy that mechanization is essential to the industry and 
should be encouraged by the union itself. As a result of 
this policy, the United Mine Workers declare that the miners 
have a right to participate, through increased wages, shorter 
hours, and better working conditions, in the increased pro-
ductive efficiency of the industry. 
2.) Mechanization is a vital factor in the coal indus-
try where labor costs represent over 60 per cent of the total 
costs. Over the past quarter century, the coal industry bas 
made considerable progress in mechanized mining operations. 
This has increased productivity and kept costs from rising 
as fast as wages. As far back as 1923, mechanization had 
made progress insofar as cutting of coal from the seam was 
concerned. Mechanical cutting methods 'accounted for 68.3% 
of the underground production of coal. But it still took 
manual labor to load the coal into coal cars or on conveyor 
belts for transport, only 0.3% of the coal produced under-
ground was loaded mechanically. 
The Mechanization in coal-mining is divided into 
three phases; mechanical cutting, mechanical loading, and 
mechanical cleaning. Of these only mechanical cutting was 
used in any significant amount until 1930.: 
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Table IX. 
Mechanization and Production per Man 
Net tons 
per man 
% of Underground 
Production 
Year Per Per 
Day Year 
Cut by Mech. 
Machine Loaded 
1933 4.78 797 84.7 
1934 4.40 785 84.1 
1935 4.50 805 84.2 
1936 4.62 920 84.8 
1937 4.69 906 (3) 
1938 4.89 790 87.5 
1939 5.25 936 87.9 
1940 5.19 1049 88.4 
1941 5.20 1125 89.0 
1942 5.12 1261 89.7 
1943 5.38 1419 90.3 
1944 5.67 1575 90.5 
1945 5.78 1508 90.8 
1946 6.30 1347 90.8 
1947 6.42 1504 90.0 
1948 6.26 1358 90.7 
(3) Data not available. 
12.0 
12.2 
20.2 
31.0 
35.4 
40.7 
45.2 
48.9 
52.9 
56.1 
58.4 
60.7 
64.3 
%of Total 
Production 
Mechanically 
Cleaned 
10.4 
11.1 
12.2 
13.9 
14.6 
20.1 
22.2 
22.9 
24.4 
24.7 
25.6 
25.6 
26.0 
30.2 
%of Total 
Production 
Mined by 
Stripping 
5.5 
5.8 
6.4 
7.1 
8.7 
8.4 
10.7 
11.5 
13.5 
16.3 
19.0 
21.1 
22.1 
Source: "Bituminous Coal and Lignite in 194911 - Mineral 
Market report No. 1923 - PP• 22-23. United States Depart-
ment of t :he Interior, Bureau of Mines. 
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Table IX shows a steady increase in mechanical 
cutting and has seemed to stablize around 90%. Experts 
agree that rrechanical cutting has progressed about as far 
as possible. Newer machines may cut faster and more effi-
ciently. But some coal always will 1:e produced in mines 
too small to warrant the expense of mechanical cutters; 
some coal seams always will require hand cutting. 
Mechanical loading reached no significant figure 
until 1933 when 12.3% of the total production was so load-
ed. As shown in Table IX, the largest increase in one year 
was in 1938, an increase of 6.5% over 1937. This is per-
haps correlated with the general wage increase of 17% for 
all miners in 1937. Then in 1941 mechanical loading in-
creased 5.3% over 1940. It was in 1941 that the industry 
as a whole began making profits again and continued its 
trend toward mechanized mining. Mechanical loading has 
increased since then on an average of 3% per year. 
Thus .in a period of ten years, mechanical load-
ing has increased 37.2% and mechanical cutting has increas-
ed 12%. The reason for this continuing trend toward mech-
anization was that wages had risen above their equilibrium 
* price and to continue operating at a profit in a highly 
competitive industry greater productivity was necessary. 
* '~quilibrium price" is that price where the marginal 
productivity of the labor equals the cost of labor. 
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A significant trend during this period was the 
increase in strip mining from 6.3% in 1932 to 23.3% in 
1948 of the total coal production. In Washington County, 
Pennsylvania, strip-mining production increased from 
839 1 069 tons of coal in 1932 to 4,140,990 tons in 1948. 
The average tons of coal per day per man in 1948 in Wash-
ington County was 16.91 while underground mining account-
ed for only an average of 5.36 tons per man. This county 
is not an isolated exception since, in 1948, the industrr-
wide average tons per man-day was 15.28 for strip mining 
and 6.26 tons for all underground mining. 
Strip mining has limitations to any further 
expansion. There are limited areas where the coal is 
close enough to the surface to be mined, while another 
limit is the forced reclaimation laws enacted in twelve 
states. The cost of reclaimation alone is a deterrent. 
The United States Bureau of Mines analysis of 
the 1945 data for deep-mining operations included in one 
group all mines with 90% and more of the production mechan-
ically loaded and in these the production per man-day aver-
aged 6.49 tons. Another grouping included all mines whose 
production was all hand-loaded where the production per 
man-day averaged 4.1 tons. The mines with 90% or more 
mechanical loa'ding averaged 2.39 tons per man-day higher 
than hand-loaded mines. The unit labor cost thereby is 
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lowered because of the increased production per man. 
The following chart shows tbe relationship be-
tween increased payrolls and the greater increase in pro-
ductivity with the corresponding effect on unit labor 
cost. In this chart, output per man-hour is a measure 
of the relationship between the volume of goods produced 
and one factor of input -- labor time. The indexes do 
not measure the specific contribution of any other single 
factor of production. 
The index of man hours is derived from Bureau 
of Labor Statistics employment series and reports of aver-
age weekly hours. The indexes of output per production 
worker and output per man-hour have been obtained by divid-
ing the production series by the indexes of employment and 
man-hours. The index of unit labor costs was obtained by 
dividing the payroll series by the production series. 
The employment definition used is the average 
number of production workers employed during the 12 months 
of the year. The indexes cover only production and relat-
ed workers and exclude salaried, supervisory, and tech-
nical employees. Production workers include above ground 
supply, maintenance, and transportation workers as well 
as those workers actively engaged in the production of 
coal. 
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Table x. 
BITUMINOUS COAL MINING 
Indexes: · 1939-100 
Year Pro- Prod. Man-
duct ion Workers Hours 
Output per--
Prod. Man- pay-
Worker Hour rolls 
Unit 
labor 
Cost 
1935 94.3 117.5 114.5 80.3 82.4 93.3 98.9 
1936 111.2 121.3 128.9 91.7 86.3 111.5 100.3 
1937 112.8 124.4 128.1 90.7 88.1 121.8 108.0 
1938 88.3 109.6 95.0 80.6 92.9 95.5 108.2 
1939 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1940 116.7 112.0 112.2 104.2 104.0 113.0 96.8 
1941 130.2 111.1 124.7 117.2 104.4 141.8 108.9 
1942 147.6 122.3 143.5 120.7 102.9 176.7 119.7 
. 1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
149.4 
156.9 
146.3 
134.7 
156.7 
112.6 151.3 
108.0 153.0 
98.6 138.4 
91.3 117.9 
98.3 129.7 
132.7 98.7 204.5 
145.3 102.5 233.8 
148.4 105.7 219.4 
147.5 114.2 206.2 
159.4 120.8 270.7 
136.9 
149.0 
150.0 
153.1 
172.8 
Note: These figures include only mines with a producing 
capacity of over a thousand tons. 
source: u. s. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics, Branch of Productivity and Technological Develop-
ment, June 1948. 
Between 1937 and 1947, production increased a 
total of 42.9 points with a decrease in production workers 
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of 26.1 points, which with the decrease in production 
workers indicate a more stable level of days worked and 
also indicates a longer work week. 
OUtput per production worker increased a total 
of 68.7 points, which shows the increase in productivity 
per worker that bas been brought a bout largely by increased 
- mechanization. Output per man hour shows an increase of 
38.7 points. The difference of 30 points between output 
per man-hour and output per production worker is due to 
the greater percentage of workers engaged in maintenance 
work. Mechanized mining requires more maintenance and 
coal cleaning than non-mechanized mines. 
A comparison of the increases of the payroll 
indexes and unit labor costs index reveals a reason for 
producers continuing their trend toward further mechani-
zation. While the payroll index more than doubled, the 
unit labor cost index increased only 60% over the 1937 
figure. 
The Bituminous Coal Institute of Washington, 
n. c. conducted a study of the American and United King-
dom coal mines in 1946. The study revealed that with 
60% more emplo,ees, the British only attained 40% of 
American production. The underground production per man-
day was 5.04 tons in the u. s. as compared with 1.12 tons 
in the United Kingdom. A miner in the United States 
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mined roughly four and a half times as much per day as a 
miner in the United Kingdom. Of this production, 47.3% 
was power-loaded in the Un i ted States as against 1.3% in 
the United Kingdom. 90.8% of the coal produced in the u. s. 
was mechanically cut while 81.5% of the total production 
was so cut in the United Kingdom. The British utilized 
far more animals for haulage than in the United States. 
The cost ratio between the heavily mechanized 
mines of the United States and the slightly mechanized 
mines of the United Kingdom is revealing. The total wage 
in 1945 in the u. s. was one billion dollars as against 
900 million dollars for the United Kingdom. The average 
weekly wage in the u. s. in 1945 was $52.05 and $23.57 
in the British mines. In other words the American miner 
received 120% more than British miners. Yet the labor 
costs per net ton in the United States was $1.76 as com-
pared to labor costs of $4.57 per ton in Great Britain. 
Total costs per ton in the United States for 1945 were 
$2.93 while the costs per ton for the United Kingdom were 
$6.46. Wages in the United States are 60.2% of total costs 
per ton of coal whereas the British wage costs were 70.8% 
of total production costs. It is evident that mechaniz-
ation is a very important factor in reducing labor costs. 
A difference of 10.6% in labor costs is a great one. 
The bituminous coal industry, aided and forced 
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by the policies of the United Mine workers of America, 
seems likely to continue their trend toward mechanization. 
This will be done in order to offset high labor eosts and 
further wage increases so as to maintain coal prices on 
a competitive level with natural gas and oil. 
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ChSpter VI. 
PROMOTION OF FAVORABLE LEGISLATION. 
1. American unions have functioned primarily as 
economic organizations rather than political organizations 
but they have evinced a keen interest in political and 
legislative matters. The late Samuel Gompers adopted the 
conservative policy of political non-partisanship during 
his tenure as President of the American Federation. The 
A. F. of L. has preferred to work through the two major 
political parties and to support its "friends" and defeat 
its "enemies". 
During the 1930's, a new political conscious-
ness developed among the leaders of the various unions 
due to the sweep of events. The 11 pro-labor" attitude of 
the early Roosevelt Administration rem~ed some of labor's 
skepticism about tbe efficacy of political action. An-
other factor affecting poll tical consciousness was the t 
the newer industrial areas had less advanced state labor 
codes than the older areas. The major event, however, 
was the rise of the c. I. o. and the formation of unions 
in previously unorganized areas of the economy. The lead-
ers of the c. r. o. held the conviction that labor's in-
terests dictate a united political front although it 
continues to act through the established political parties. 
2. Labor's Non-Partisan League was founded in 1936 
with John L. Lewis as National Chairman. During the first 
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part of 1 ts ex is te nee, the Lea gue wa s supported by the 
c. r. o. and the A. F. of L. for t he purpose of re-elect-
ing President Roosevelt. It has been estimated that the 
League spent $1,000,000 in the l93 E3 election campaign. 
The League was a. na. tiona.l organize. ti on but it had many 
branches. The one in New York, known as the American 
Labor Party was the most outstanding . Although the im-
mediate purpose of the League was the re-election of 
President Roosevelt, its founders d.e cided to continue 
the organization for political acti.on. 
Labor's Non-P artisian Lea gue entered into an 
agreement with the Farmer's Union i .n 1937 which provided 
for mutual legislative support, bot h at Washington and 
at state capitals, and for co-opera tion during the elec-
tion campaigns of 1938. The League in 1937 participated 
in many local and state campaigns with mixed results. The 
founders of the League were satisfied with the results. 
It is noteworthy that the League supported immediate object-
ives and did not subscribe to the Marxian "inevitabilities". 
In 1938, Chairman Lewis said: "Eve nts of the past eight-
een months have not only justified t he wisdom of the lead-
ers wbo established Labor's Non-Par t isan League in the 
summer 0f 1936, but have also demons t r ated that effective 
labor political organization is nece ssary ad j unct of in-
dustrial organization in ga i ning fo r American workers 
their proper participation j,n the i.ndustrial and political 
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life of the nation." 
In 1938 President Green asked the A. F. of L. 
unions to leave Labor's Non-Partisan League because it 
was under the domination of the c. I. o. This split caused 
the defeat of a number of labor candidates in 1938 because 
the A. F. of L. supported some of t he opposition candidates. 
The Second Constitutional Convent i.on of the c. I. o. in 1939 
voted endorsement of the League as an effective means for 
united political action. Despite this vote of confidence 6 
the League began to decline because of political differ-
emcee between Chairman Le wis and c1ther members of the 
League. In 19406 the director and associate director of 
Labor's Non-Partisan League resigned because they were 
unwilling to oppose tbe re-election of President Roosevelt. 
Mr. lewis took over the reins of control at this time and 
appointed John T~ Jones of the District of Columbia Indus-
trial Union Council as the League ' s director. 
The League began to fade into the background in 
the c. I. o. and became; in the ma in 6 a part of the United 
Mine Workers' organization. I n 1942 6 Chairman John L. 
Lewis said: "Labor's Non-PartisaJl League under the direc-
tion of Mr. John T. Jones, its Dir ector, has, in a sub-
stantial sense, acted as Legislat i ve Instrument of the 
United Mine Workers of America; and as such is due tba 
36.) Proceedings of the Thirty-fi fth Constitutional Conven-
tion of the United Mine Workers of America 6 January 25 to 
February 3, 1938. P• 46. 
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gratitude and co:rnrrenda tion of our t~ ntire membership, and 
all labor as well. Its staff ha.s ma intained constant 
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watch upon developments and issues pending in Congress." 
3. The league was active in opposing bills consid-
ered detrimental to the interests of the coal miners. The 
U. M. W. officers and the league s ucceeded on February 7, 
1942 in obtaining an amendmant to 'the Natural Gas Act of 
1938. The Natural Gas Act of 1938 placed pipe line com-
panies under the jurisdiction of t he Federal Power Com-
mission. The 1942 amendmant made t he regulations more 
stringent and granted the u. M. w. rights of intervention 
in future hearings. The u. M. w. officials testified in 
bearings before the House Rive r s and Harbors Committee 
in opposition to the st. Lawre nce Seaway and Power Pro-
ject, which was provided for in the House Omnibus Rivers 
and Harbors Bill, H.R. 5993. 
The League and the offic l als of the Internation-
al Union appeared in bearings befor e House and Senate 
committees and actively supported pending legislation . in 
1941. This pending legislation in c luded an amendment to 
the National Housing Act, anti-lynching bills, poll tax 
bills, and w. P. A. appropriations . The most vigorous 
campaign waged by the United Mine workers and the League 
37.) .Joint Report of the Interne tional Officers to the 
Thirty-Seventh Constitutional Convention of the United 
Mine Workers of America, October Ei, 1942, P. 100 
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was in favor of the Federal Mine I nspection Act of 1941. 
The successful passage of this bill represented the climax 
of a two year campaign by the League for Federal legisla-
tion to improve safety conditions l n the coal mining in-
dustry. 
The attorneys of the Un ited Mine Workers were 
active in opposing the natural gas interests in hearings 
before the Federal Power Commission and the courts of 
appeal from 1946-1948. The United Mine Workers had the 
assistance of some of the eastern r ail!'oads and the East-
ern Gas and Fuel Associates in some of these hearings in 
1947. The cases in which the att orneys intervened were 
many and varied, ranging from smal l line operations to 
transcontinental lines. Among the) larger companies were 
the Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, the Trans-
Continental Pipe Line Company, the Metropolitan Eastern 
Corporation, and the Mid-Continen t Gas Transportation 
Company. The fight a gainst the e x t ension of natural gas 
into the eastern section of the c ountry has been carried 
on by the United Mine Workers for the past ten years and 
has been intensified in the period from 1945 to 1948. It 
is impossible to gauge the de gree of success of this fight 
against a competing fuel but the success seems to be one 
of delaying but not prohibiti ng t he spread of natural gas. 
It seems likely that t he United Mine Workers 
will continue to oppose and delay the spread of natural 
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gas. The stand taken on the naturHl gas issue by the of-
ficers of the United Mine Workers s reflected in the fol-
lowing statements: "A continued insistence that adequate 
gas supplies be shown before a pro je ct is approved will 
retard the e~pansion of existing p i pelines and prevent 
the construction of others. As me nt ioned above, the Mid-
Continent Company abandoned its pro ject when it failed to 
prove the possession of an adequate gas supply. While the 
accomplishments in the past have bt3en limited, it can at 
least be said that the obstacles w i.~ich we have placed in 
the way of pipeline expansion have delayed the installa-
tion of .facilities to the extent t ha t many years of addi-
tional work for a very substantial number of mine workers 
has been preserved. Prospects of future greater success 
would appear to warrant a continuation of the fight which 
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is being made, and we recommend its continuance." 
The United Mine Workers in accordance with their 
be lie fs fought vigorously to pr eve :n t the sale of the Big 
and Little Inch Pipelines to priva.t e interests. These 
pipelines were built by the Federa l Government during the 
national emergency period to exped i te the flow of oil from 
the Southwest to the Eastern seaboard. 
In 1947, the War Assests Administration decided 
38.) Joint Report of the International Officers to the 
Fortieth Consecutive Con~ention of the United Mine Work-
ers of America, October · 5, 1948, p. 147. 
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these pipelines were surplus an~ s hould be made available 
for public use. The argument adva nced by the lawyers of 
the u. M. W. in this case is t ypica l of the reasoning used 
in all natural gas cases intervened in by the u. M. w. 
Chief u. M. w. Counsel Welly K. Hopkins said: "We feel 
that these pipelines were wartime projects and~ therefore, 
are expendable~ just as any other t emporary investment. 
They should not be leased or sold t o private indus try, or 
be governmentally operated or subs i dized. They should be 
held intact in reserve for any fut ure emergency. To allow 
oil or natural gas to be unfai r ly delivered through this 
medium, into the coal markets of this country and thus 
improperly compete with the abundant coals now being pro-
duced by private industry would ce r tainly tend to seriously 
interrupt and impede postwar recon version. Such natural 
resources as oil and gas should, s o far as economically 
feasible, be conserved in place and certainly be used 
wherever possible at point of ortgin rather than be trans-
ported a thousand miles in the hear t of the coal fields 
whose life exceeds by hundreds of years, the like of known 
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reserves of oil and gas." The Big and Little Inch Pipe-
lines were sold for $143,127,000 to the Texas Eastern 
Transmission Company by the Federal Government. 
Labor's Non-Part isa.n Le ague opposed the perennial 
39. ) Ibid P • 153 • 
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St. lawrence Seaway bill, the Select ive Service blll of 
1948, and the Mundt Anti-Commun ist b ill in 1948. The 
League and the union officials favored and worked for the 
Wagner-Ellender-Taft Housing bill a nd the Labor Federal 
Security Appropriation bill, which wa s a large appropria-
tion by the Federal Government for extensive research in 
the field of cancer. On April 3, 1947, John L. Lewis appear-
ed before a Subcommittee of the House Education and Labor 
Committee to testify on Mine Safety. Through arrangements 
made by John T. Jones, Director of Labor's Non-Partisan 
League, Mr. Lewis' statement was carried by four networks 
and given wide publicity by the League. Thousands of 
copies of his testimony were printed by the League to gain 
public support for proposed sa f ety legislation then pend-
ing in Congress. 
The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, com-
monly known as the Taft-Hartley Law, has been vehemently 
opposed by the officers of the Uni ted Mine Workers and 
Labor's Non-Partisan League. This bill was opposed by the 
u. M. w. from its inception. Pres ident John L. Lewis went 
be fore the Senate Labor Committee :tn opposition to the 
Taft-Hartely Bill on March 7, 1947 . In a reply to Senator 
Ball of Minnesota, President Lewis said: 11 Let me say this 
to you, Senator: Whenever the Congress of the United States 
enacts a bill imposing compulsory arbitration upon all the 
citizens of America who work with their hands and brains, 
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then the end of the Republic is right there." 
Mr. lewis criticized the leaders of the A. F. of L. 
for signing the non-Communist affadavit required by the 
Taft-Hartley Act as he believed the Act and its purposes 
could be defeated by refusing to do so. rt was disagree-
ment over the signing of the affadavit that led the u. M. w. 
to disaffiliate with the A· F. of L. 
Labor's Non-Partisan League distributed 17o.ooo 
pamphlets in an effort to gain publ i c support for the 
repeal of the Labor-Management Relat ions Act of 1947. 
John T. Jones. Director of the League. has appeared before 
many civic and legislative groups in opposition to the 
Taft-Hartley Act. The United Mine Workers Journal printed 
the names of Representatives and Senators from coal-mining 
states that had voted for the Taft - Hartley Act and urged 
their defeat in ~he coming elections . 
Mr. Lewis and the u. M. w. have continued their 
fight against the Taft-Hartley Act a nd are still fighting 
against it at the present time. Their feelings a gainst it 
is shown in a Labor Day address ma de by John L. Lewis at 
Coaldale. Pennsylvania on September 4, 1950. President 
Lewis said: "The Taft-Hartley Law, conceived by Senator 
Taft at the request a nd with the support of the organized 
employers of this country represente d by the National 
40.) Ibid P• 156. 
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Association of Manufactures and ot her similar organizations, 
was designed to impede the growing strength and the progress 
which the unions of labor in this country have been making 
in re cent years. It palls from t he standpoint of American-
ism. It is treachery to the prin c iples of the Constitution. 
*.,,Hl- I hope our Pre sident and our c ountry will not forget 
that while we are handing out libe rty to peoples in other 
countries in such great volume tha t we ought to keep a 
little bit of it here at home and abol i sh the Taft-Hartley 
Act. An action of t bat kind here in America would, I think, 
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be very encouraging to everyone 1 " 
The United Mine Workers have consistent~y opposed 
the formation of a Labor Party. Other labor leaders, nota-
bly Walter Reuther of the United Automobile Wprkers, have 
favored the formation of a third party. In March 1946, 
Mr. Reuther said: "I am for laying the ground work and 
carefully preparing the basis fo r the formation of a third 
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party at some future date." .r obn L. Lewis and the other 
officials closely follow the teachings of the late u. M. w. 
president, John Mitchell. Mr. Mi tchell opposed the form-
ation of a Labor party on the grounds that union work would 
be neglected in favor of pol i tica l activities and that able 
leaders would leave the unions i n favor of political jobs. 
41.) United Mine Workers Journal, Volume LXI, No. 18, 
September 15, 1950, Washington, D. c. P. 14 
42.) 11 The New York Times", Marc h 31, 1946. 
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Arthur Krock, chief Was hington correspondent of 
the New York Times, asked Mr. Lewi s in an interview if he 
still opposed the formation of Ame rican labor into a po-
litical party with the British example in mind. Mr. Lewis 
replied: "Let us be gin with the case of Great Britain. 
The population there is sitting on a coal deposit which, 
if taken from t he earth by modern methods~ would solve the 
economic problem of the British. But first British manage-
ment made the mistake of letting obsolescence weaken the 
industry. And then British labor made the mistake of be-
coming a political party and using the political instead 
of the economic approach to national problems. The result 
is what you see. In 1948 American miners took out approx-
imately 600~000~000 tons. Britis h miners took out less 
than 200,000. And in this country the mining force was 
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404~000 and in Britain it was 736 ~ 000." 
43.) "The New York Times", March 3, 1950. 
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Chapter VII. 
smm~RY. 
The general policies of the u. M. w. are greatly 
dependent upon the future of the coal industry. It is an 
industry which is indispensable t o the national economy 
and is our major long-range source of energy but it is 
beset with problems. The solution of these problems will 
have an impact upon all industry and the United Mine Workers. 
1. Great progress in mechanization has been made by 
the coal industry in the past twen ty-five years. Mechani-
cal cutting has progressed about as far as it can go as is 
indicated by the fact that little imprevement in the per-
centage of machine-cut coal has been made since 1938. 
There is p1enty of opportunity for further mechanization in 
the loading of coal. Mining engineers believe that mechani-
cal loading can be increased to 75% of the coal produced 
before the optimum point wou~d be reached. It has been 
asserted by the u. s. Bureau of Mines that mine efficiency 
could be stepped up tremendously simply by reducing the 
idle time of the machines used in the coal mines. 
Bituminous Coal Research, Inc., is spending 
$250,000 in research on a machine that would combine cut-
ting and loading operations for underground mines. There 
are two such mac hines that dig and load coal in one oper-
ation on the market today. There are the Joy Manufactur-
ing Co.'s "Continuous Miner" and sunnyhill Coal Co.•s 
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"Colmol". This type of machine present many technical 
problems that haven't been surmoun t ed by mining engineers 
so their use is only for experimen t al operations. 
The United Mine Worker's policy of fostering 
mechanization has aided the industry's drive toward mecha-
nization. It is undoubtedly true that the union's con-
stant pressure for higher wages an d other benefits have 
played a big part in coal mine mec hanization as the oper-
ators have had to step up efficiency to offset rising costs. 
With labor costs standarized by the collective bargaining 
of the U. M. w., the efficient ope r ator is in better po-
sition to win out over the less eff icient competitor. 
America's energy is derived from four sources: 
coal, natural gas, petroleum, and water power. Over the 
past thirty years, the demand for t his energy has increased 
by two-thirds but coal only supplied 1% more energy in 1948 
than 1918. In 1918, coal accounted for 82.3% of the energy 
while petroleum accounted for 10.9%, natural gas for 3.6%, 
and water power for 3.2% whereas in 1947, coal supplied 
50.2% of our energy, petroleum 32.5%, natural gas 13.3%, 
and water power ~%. Oil and gas have cut into two major 
markets for coal - the railroads, a nd domestic and co.m-
merical heating. 
The United Mine Workers' have taken an active 
interest in legislation affecting the extension of natural 
gas through pipelines into the thickly populated East. 
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The u. M. w. officials recognize the fact that any house-
wife would prefer to have oil or gas heating in her home 
because it is cleaner and requires less attention. It is 
also recognized that the growing narket in the Southwest 
is beyond the geographical market of the major coal-pro-
ducing states. So the u. M. w. with the aid of coal as-
sociations have consistently opposed the extension of 
natural gas. The attempts to combat natural gas have been 
on a legislative front ~ather than on a price basis. 
The railroads accounted for 22% of the domestic 
co~umption in 1938 while in 1948 6 they used only 18% of 
the coal produced. The reason for this change was the 
switch to the more efficient diesel-electric locomotive. 
The diesels' share of freight servl,ce raised from 3.6% 
in 1944 to 20% 1n 1948, and in pas senger service from 8% 
in 1944 to 38.7% in 1948. In the event of a decline of 
rail traffic 6 the less efficient steam locomotives would 
be the first taken out of service . This drop in coal con-
sumption would hasten the decline of the highly cyclical 
coal industry. 
The steel and electric utility industries have 
steadily increased their use of coal. In 19386 coke ac-
counted for 13.8% of the coal consumption and reached 
20.6% of the coal consumed in 1948. The electric utility 
industry has increased its tonnage consumption two and a 
half times from 1938 to 1948. It accounted for 11.3% of 
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tpe domestic consumption in 1938 and 18.3% in 1948. 
The trend toward larger units in the coal indus-
try has continued throughout the years until in 1948, nine 
per cent of the mines produced two-thirds of the coal mined. 
This trend has been aided by the United Mine Workers' policy 
of higher wages and shorter hours. The wages and hours are 
standard throughout the industry and have tended to favor 
the more efficient large coal producer. The added cost of 
the Welfare Fund has forced many marginal producers out of 
business. 
2. The long-range outlook for the coal industry is 
good. Coal is tHe one fuel available in unlimited quanti-
ties while America's need for energy will continue to grow. 
The electric utility industry is a greatly expanding indus-
try which expects by 1955 to incre a se their generating 
capacity 80% over the 1948 level. Coal, burned in steam 
generating plants, a_ccounts for 5z,b of tne utilities' power 
output. And there is every indication that in the years 
ahead its relative importance will increase rather than 
decrease. The Edison Electric Institute expects coal will 
be used to produce 56% of the output in 1955 and close to 
58% in 1961. Even allowing for increased fuel efficiency, 
the utility industry's demand for coal will expand possibly 
to 120 million tons of coal per ye ar in 1955. 
The railroads, particularly the Eastern roads, 
are bothered by the inc·reased use of diesel-electric loco-
motives. Coa 1 comprises 30% of the railroads' total rev-
enue freight and it is not good cus tomer relations to 
desert a customer's products. The Eastern railroads have 
formed a committee to design a coa.l-fired gas turbine loco-
motive. This project bas not reached a conclusive stage 
as yet but it offers considerable promise for the future. 
It has become inc~easingly apparent that the 
United States must turn eventually to synthetic sources 
to augment its petroleum resources. Among the raw materi-
. als that can be turned into synthetic oil and gasoline is 
coal, which comprises 98.8% of the nation 1 s mineral fuel 
reserves. The other 1.2% is divided as follows: oilshale, 
0.8%; petroleum and natural gas, 0.2% each. Oil from coal 
is not impossible as the Germans got 30% of their supply 
from coal in 1944. 
The Federal Government has built two plants in 
Louisiana, Missouri to produce oil from coal. O;ne pls.nt 
is expected to produce two hundred barrels of gasoline a 
day by tbe process of hydrogenation of coal. Hydrogen-
ation involves the addition of hydrogen under pressure 
with the aid of a catalyst to turn coal into oil and causes 
a high-octane gasoline to result. The other plant will 
utilize the Tropsch-Fisher process to extract motor gas-
oline and die se 1 fue 1 from the coa 1. The Tropsch-Fisher 
process consists of maklng coke from coal and then gasi-
fying tbe coke in water gas machine. 
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Commercial companies that have entered this 
field include Standard Oil of New Jersey, Gulf Oil, Koppers, 
and Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Co., the largest commer-
cial coal-producer. Cheaper synthetic fuel manufacturing 
methods coupled with higher production costs for crude oil 
would change the competitive picture even before our known 
oil reserves are depleted. 
Even by ignoring these possible new uses for 
coal, it is possible to forecast a soft coal production 
of 700-million tons by 1965 with some justification. The 
basis for this estimate is that there will be an overall 
increase of 25% in the energy requ i rements of the nation, 
with 165-million people using machines to do more of their 
work while coal will have to furnish only 13% more energy 
than it did in 1947 to reach the 700-million ton output. 
Without this increase and a ten per cent cut ln the present 
per capita coal consumption of 4.4 tons a year, the indus-
try would produce over 650 million tons of coal a year. 
The policies of the United Mine Workers would 
be greatly affected by the future of the coal industry. 
With a production of 700-million tons a.nnually, there would 
be a higher level of employment in the coal industry and 
the u. M. w. would be able to press for higher wages and 
shorter hours. The Wage and Hour policy is moulded by the 
condition of the coal industry and a high level of activity 
would stimulate the demands' for increases in wages. 
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The increase in productivity brought about by 
new cutting' and loading machines would have a two-fold 
effect. It would reduce the manpower necessary in the 
industry and stimulate demands for ~igher wages for those 
remaining in the industry. An advantageous factor is that 
increased productivity would lessen the burden of the roy-
alty on coal for the Welfare and Retirement Fund. It would 
take a lesser amount of money to maintain the welfare fund 
for fewer men. With less men in the industry~ there would 
be fewer injured to care for. 
The other possible uses for coal, such as syn-
thetic fuel, would broaden the market for coal and somewhat 
stabilize the production of coal. Coal production is 
geared directly to consumption since there is little stock-
piling in the coal industry. With an increased consump-
tion, the industry would be able to offer the miners a 
longer workyear. This would decrease the union's pressure 
for higher wages to offset the cyclical variations in 
employment in coal mining. 
The coal industry is indispensable to the nation-
al economy. There is no question that a strong coal indus-
try will be required in America in the years ahead. Atomic 
energy - the big question mark - may supplant other forms of 
energy in future years but industrial use of atomic energy 
seems far in the future. The problems of transmission and 
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radioactivity are formidable barriers for atomic energy 
to overcome. 
The United Mine Workers of America seem likely 
to continue as the representative of labor in the coal-
mining indus try. It is a cohesive a nd we 11-organ ized 
union with capable leadership. The loss of the present · 
leadership would impair but not de stroy the future of the 
union as the union is not a reflect i on of a leader's per-
sonality; rather the leade r reflect s the personality of 
the union. 
The diminution of members h ip would not alter 
the intent and purposes of the union . Jol:m L. Lewis, 
reflecting the fee lings of the union members, said: tt But 
it does not make any difference whe t her we have 500,000 
men in the coal mines or only 50,000 . If we only had 
50,000, they ought to be tre~ted humanely, they ought to 
be paid a wage to protect treir l i v i ng standard; they ought 
to have these participations and tbi s dignity of labor 
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in t he household of our Republic." 
44.) Testimony of John L. Lewis be f ore the House of Rep-
resentatives Subcommittee on Miner' s Welfare of the Com-
mittee on Education and Labor, Apri l 3, 1947, P. 50, 
Published and Distributed by Labor's Non~Partisan League, 
Was h ington, D. C. 
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